Switch to: References

Citations of:

Phenomenological approaches to consciousness

In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 686--696 (2007)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 3).Jeffrey White & Jun Tani - 2017 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 17 (1):11-22.
    This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus on system criticality and self, develops a distinction between simulated and formal consciousness based on this emphasis, reviews Tani and colleagues' work in light of this distinction, and ends by forecasting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the Essentially Dynamic Nature of Concepts: Constant if Incremental Motion in Conceptual Spaces.Joel Parthemore - 2019 - In Peter Gärdenfors, Antti Hautamäki, Frank Zenker & Mauri Kaipainen (eds.), Conceptual Spaces: Elaborations and Applications. Springer Verlag.
    Concepts are the means by which we structure our understanding of the world and consequently the primary means by which we encounter it. It is commonly assumed that one of the essential characteristics of concepts – regardless of referent – is their stability, tending toward stasis;and, indeed, it can be hard to see how concepts can otherwise be systematic and productive, inthe way they are conventionally taken to be. Even the question has been raised whether conceptscan change; on some prominent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Will the real artist stand up? : Computational creativity as mirror to the human soul.Joel Parthemore - unknown
    This paper argues that a too-expansive view on creativity is unhelpful at best and deeply misleading at worst. As with “representation”, the word “creativity” comes value-laden in ways that researchers cannot lightly get away from, if they can escape at all; simply claiming that one is using the word in a technical sense is not a solution. Neither should one take an overly narrow view that takes advantage of a priori arguments to deny creativity to classes of agents or putative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark