This article discusses two normative questions raised by cases of colonial settlement. First, is it sometimes wrong to migrate and settle in a previously inhabited land? If so, under what conditions? Second, should settler countries ever take steps to undo wrongful settlement, by enforcing repatriation and return? The article argues that it is wrong to settle in another country in cases where one comes with intent to colonize the population against their will, or one possesses an adequate territorial base somewhere (...) else, lacks an urgent interest in moving, and seeks to settle in a new place under conditions where settlement would severely harm the practices of prior occupants. It also argues for a presumption of repatriation and return in the first generation of wrongful settlement and holds that these remedies may be extended to second and higher generations in some – but not all – cases. (shrink)

If justice means equal participation and inclusion, as authors such as Axel Honneth or Nancy Fraser have argued, the question still remains: inclusion in what, and of whom? This question has not been investigated with sufficient attention. Drawing on the example of the experience of Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, I address this issue by distinguishing different meanings of equality which correspond to different types of political struggles. In so doing, I re-examine Honneth’s claim that the critical theory of recognition has (...) no room for cultural groups as referents of a potential ‘fourth principle of recognition’ beyond legal equality, the merit principle, and love. It is argued that Honneth’s critique of collective rights neglects crucial differences between the types of groups that exist in modern states, and between the different kinds of struggles for equality waged by those groups. (shrink)