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  1. (1 other version)Pragmatische wende und „erklärung“ in der wissenschaftstheorie.Hans Lenk - 1989 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 20 (1):87-96.
    The new so-called pragmatic-epistemic approach to the methodology of explanation seems to dispense with the difference between traditional epistemic reasoning and genuine explanation. Causal explanations are excluded from the debate. Instead, the degree and value of subjective conviction seems to be the decisive factor for explanation. The paper criticizes this restrictive approach for methodological and terminological reasons without denying the importance of epistemic, pragmatic considerations. In addition, the respective traditional thesis on the logical-structural identity of prediction and explanation and the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Pragmatische Wende und „Erklärung“ in der Wissenschaftstheorie.Hans Lenk - 1989 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 20 (1):87-96.
    The new so-called pragmatic-epistemic approach to the methodology of explanation seems to dispense with the difference between traditional epistemic reasoning and genuine explanation. Causal explanations are excluded from the debate. Instead, the degree and value of subjective conviction seems to be the decisive factor for explanation. The paper criticizes this restrictive approach for methodological and terminological reasons without denying the importance of epistemic, pragmatic considerations. In addition, the respective traditional thesis on the logical-structural identity of prediction and explanation and the (...)
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  • Bemerkungen zur pragmatisch-epistemischen wende in der wissenschaftstheoretischen analyse der ereigniserklärungen.Hans Lenk - 1985 - Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):461 - 473.
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  • Zur verteidigung einiger hempelscher thesen gegen kritiken stegmüllers.Michael Küttner - 1985 - Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):475 - 484.
    The aim of this paper is to defend some of C. G. Hempel's basic theses concerning the logic of explanation and prediction against criticisms recently made by W. Stegmüller. It is argued (very concisely) thatthese is no need for essentially pragmatic conditions in DN-arguments;only the structural identity sub-thesis “Every adequate prediction is ... an adequate explanation” can be held instead of the one Hempel has in mind;the notion of the ambiguity of probabilistic explanations should be reformulated;there is no need for (...)
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  • Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts.Kareem Khalifa - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (4):263-284.
    Explanatory contrastivists hold that we often explain phenomena of the form p rather than q. In this paper, I present a new, social‐epistemological model of contrastive explanation—accountabilism. Specifically, my view is inspired by social‐scientific research that treats explanations fundamentally as accounts; that is, communicative actions that restore one's social status when charged with questionable behaviour. After developing this model, I show how accountabilism provides a more comprehensive model of contrastive explanation than the causal models of contrastive explanation that are currently (...)
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  • (1 other version)Zur Bewertung der pragmatischen Erklärungsmodelle.András Kertész - 1988 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (2):239-251.
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  • (1 other version)Zur bewertung der pragmatischen erklärungsmodelle.András Kertész - 1988 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (2):239-251.
    Though the last decade has seen a growing interest in pragmatic approaches to scientific explanation, the question as to the real nature of these attempts has not been answered as yet. Three possibilities are investigated: 1. the pragmatic turn is a kind of linguistic turn where "pragmatic" refers to linguistic pragmatics; 2. the pragmatic turn is a semiotic turn in that the term "pragmatic" should be understood in the sense of semiotic pragmatics; 3. the pragmatic turn is in fact a (...)
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  • The role of contrast in causal and explanatory claims.Christopher Hitchcock - 1996 - Synthese 107 (3):395 - 419.
    Following Dretske (1977), there has been a considerable body of literature on the role of contrastive stress in causal claims. Following van Fraassen (1980), there has been a considerable body of literature on the role of contrastive stress in explanations and explanation-requesting why-questions. Amazingly, the two bodies of literature have remained almost entirely disjoint. With an understanding of the contrastive nature of ordinary causal claims, and of the linguistic roles of contrastive stress, it is possible to provide a unified account (...)
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  • Explaining differences and weighting causes.Germund Hesslow - 1983 - Theoria 49 (2):87-111.
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  • Notes on the History of Ideas Behind AGM.Peter Gärdenfors - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):115 - 120.
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  • An epistemic analysis of explanations and causal beliefs.Peter Gärdenfors - 1990 - Topoi 9 (2):109-124.
    The analyses of explanation and causal beliefs are heavily dependent on using probability functions as models of epistemic states. There are, however, several aspects of beliefs that are not captured by such a representation and which affect the outcome of the analyses. One dimension that has been neglected in this article is the temporal aspect of the beliefs. The description of a single event naturally involves the time it occurred. Some analyses of causation postulate that the cause must not occur (...)
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  • On the logic of theory change: Contraction functions and their associated revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón - 1982 - Theoria 48 (1):14-37.
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  • The two dams and that damned paresis.John W. Carroll - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):65-81.
    Philosophers of science take it as a datum that Mayor John's having syphilis explains why he, rather than certain nonsyphilitics, had paresis. Using a new hypothetical example, the case of the two dams, it is argued that three independent considerations invalidate these philosophers' starting point.
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  • A Means-End Account of Explainable Artificial Intelligence.Oliver Buchholz - 2023 - Synthese 202 (33):1-23.
    Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) seeks to produce explanations for those machine learning methods which are deemed opaque. However, there is considerable disagreement about what this means and how to achieve it. Authors disagree on what should be explained (topic), to whom something should be explained (stakeholder), how something should be explained (instrument), and why something should be explained (goal). In this paper, I employ insights from means-end epistemology to structure the field. According to means-end epistemology, different means ought to be (...)
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  • Inductive-nomological explanations and psychological laws.Robert Audi - 1981 - Theory and Decision 13 (3):229-249.
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  • On the logic of theory change: Contraction functions and their associated revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourron & David Makinson - 1982 - Theoria 48 (1):14-37.
    A study in the logic of theory change, examining the properties of maxichoice contraction and revision operations.
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  • Why Questions, and Why Just Why-Questions?Matti Sintonen - 1999 - Synthese 120 (1):125-135.
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  • Scientific explanation: A critical survey.Gerhard Schurz - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (3):429-465.
    This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic whyexplanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabilistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, the height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and probabilistic explanations (...)
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  • Explanation as unification.Gerhard Schurz - 1999 - Synthese 120 (1):95-114.
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  • A defense of a unificationist theory of explanation.Rebecca Schweder - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (4):421-435.
    This paper defends a unificationist theory of explanation. I first explore the notion of understanding entrenched by the unificationist. Then I present an overview of various kinds of causal statements and explanations. It is claimed that only genuine causal law statements have explanatory power. Finally, I attempt to fit causal explanations into the unificationist theory of explanation. In this way, I try to provide an account of how causal explanations provide understanding of the phenomena that they explain.
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  • Statistical explanation reconsidered.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Synthese 48 (3):437 - 472.
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  • Die deduktiv-nomologische erklärung AlS hauptmotiv empirisch-wissenschaftlicher tätigkeit.Edmund Nierlich - 1988 - Erkenntnis 29 (1):1 - 33.
    In this paper an attempt is made at developing the notion of a real and complete empirical explanation as excluding all forms of potential or incomplete explanations. This explanation is, however, no longer conceived as the proper aim of empirical science, for it can certainly be gleaned from recent epistemological publications that no comprehensive notion of a real and complete scientific explanation is likely to be constructed from within empirical science. Contrary to common understanding the empirical explanation, deductive-nomological as well (...)
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  • Adults' learning of complex explanations violates their intuitions about optimal explanatory order.Amanda M. McCarthy, Nicole Betz & Frank C. Keil - 2024 - Cognition 246 (C):105767.
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  • AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence.Raúl Carnota & Ricardo Rodríguez - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 1--42.
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  • Changing minds about climate change: Belief revision, coherence, and emotion.Paul Thagard & Scott Findlay - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 329--345.
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  • Understanding Interests and Causal Explanation.Petri Ylikoski - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    This work consists of two parts. Part I will be a contribution to a philo- sophical discussion of the nature of causal explanation. It will present my contrastive counterfactual theory of causal explanation and show how it can be used to deal with a number of problems facing theories of causal explanation. Part II is a contribution to a discussion of the na- ture of interest explanation in social studies of science. The aim is to help to resolve some controversies (...)
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  • (1 other version)Explanation and Understanding through Scientific Models.Richard David-Rus - 2009 - Dissertation, University Munich
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