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A set often rules is proposed for dealing with problems of ambiguity when interpreting a text of argumentative discourse. The rules are based on Grice's pragmatic rules for a collaborative conversation and on principles and maxims used to deal with ambiguity in interpreting legal and religious writings. The rules are meant to be applied to a given argument used in a given case, and to resolve (or at least deal with) an ambiguity in the argument (or affecting the argument) by (...) |
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This paper will describe what happened to the community of informal logicians between 1983 and 1987, when they started to interact with communication scholars, rhetoricians and Pragma-Dialecticians. Special attention will be paid to key events, such as the Second International Symposiums on Informal Logic, the founding of AILACT in 1983, the start of journal Informal logic in 1984, and the international conference on argumentation held at Amsterdam in 1986. |
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This essay on the social history of logic instruction considers the programmatic writings of Carnap/Neurath, but especially in the widely read book by Lillian Lieber, Mits, Wits and Logic, where Mits is the man in the street and Wits the woman in the street. In the ‘pre-Toulmin’ days it was seriously argued that the intense study of formal logic would create a more rational frame of mind and have many beneficial effects upon the social and political life. It arose from (...) |
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Derivationists, those wishing to explain the correctness and rigour of informal proofs in terms of associated formal proofs, are generally held to be supported by the success of the project of translating informal proofs into computer-checkable formal counterparts. I argue, however, that this project is a false friend for the derivationists because there are too many different associated formal proofs for each informal proof, leading to a serious worry of overgeneration. I press this worry primarily against Azzouni's derivation-indicator account, but (...) |
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In a series of influential articles, the anti-realist Arthur Fine has repeatedly charged that a certain very popular argument for scientific realism, that only realism can explain the instrumental success of science, begs the question. I argue that on no plausible reading ofthe fallacy does the realist argument beg the question. In fact, Fine is himself guilty of what DeMorgan called the "opponent fallacy.". |
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The product/process distinction with regards to “argument” has a longstanding history and foundational role in argumentation theory. I shall argue that, regardless of one’s chosen ontology of arguments, arguments are not the product of some process of arguing. Hence, appeal to the distinction is distorting the very organizational foundations of argumentation theory and should be abandoned. |
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Both because of the vagueness of the word ‘give’ when speaking about giving reasons, and because we lack an adequate definition of ‘reasons’, there is a harmful ambiguity in the expression ‘giving reasons’. Particularly, straightforwardly identifying argumentation with reasons giving would make of virtually any interplay a piece of argumentation. Besides, if we adopt the mainstream definition of reasons as “considerations that count in favour of doing or believing something”, then only good argumentation would count as argumentation. In this paper, (...) |
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