Vaidya and Wallner [2021] claim that most relevant theories in recent epistemology of modality, that is, Conceivability-Theory, Counterfactual-Theory, and Deduction-Theory, face what they name “the problem of modal epistemic friction”, in a nutshell, the need to add some relevant information about the nature of the world that is not provided by the theories as such. Their proposal is that essences supply the needed information. In this paper I will agree with Vaidya and Waller’s detection of the problem of modal epistemic (...) friction, but I will importantly disagree with their solution in terms of a metaphysics and epistemology of essences. I will argue that knowledge of essence is neither necessary nor sufficient for metaphysical modal knowledge and claim instead that modal knowledge is firstly grounded in the categories that conform the facts of reality. Categorial knowledge does the job of creating the friction needed in all cases of modal metaphysical knowledge.Moreover, given the structural character of metaphysical categories, intuition is the basic proper form of modal knowledge. In fact, I will contend that intuition is the source of a priori knowledge invoked in Kripkean schemas for a posteriori modal truths. (shrink)