We prove that the general scheme for physical theories that we have called semantic realism(SR) in some previous papers copes successfully with a number of EPR-like paradoxes when applied to quantum physics (QP). In particular, we consider the old arguments by Furry and Bohm- Aharonov and show that they are not valid within a SR framework. Moreover, we consider the Bell-Kochen-Specker und the Bell theorems that should prove that QP is inherently contextual and nonlocal, respectively, and show that they can (...) be invalidated in the SR approach. This removes the seeming contradiction between the basic assumptions of SR and QP, and proves that some problematic features that are usually attributed to QP, us contextuality and nonlocality, occur because of the adoption of a verificationist position, from one side, and from an insufficient adherence to the operational principles that have inspired QP itself, from the other side. (shrink)

We present a procedure which allows us to recover classical and nonclassical logical structures as concrete logics associated with physical theories expressed by means of classical languages. This procedure consists in choosing, for a given theory ${{\mathcal{T}}}$ and classical language ${{\fancyscript{L}}}$ expressing ${{\mathcal{T}}, }$ an observative sublanguage L of ${{\fancyscript{L}}}$ with a notion of truth as correspondence, introducing in L a derived and theory-dependent notion of C-truth (true with certainty), defining a physical preorder $\prec$ induced by C-truth, and finally selecting (...) a set of sentences ϕ V that are verifiable (or testable) according to ${{\mathcal{T}}, }$ on which a weak complementation ⊥ is induced by ${{\mathcal{T}}. }$ The triple $(\phi_{V},\prec,^{\perp})$ is then the desired concrete logic. By applying this procedure we recover a classical logic and a standard quantum logic as concrete logics associated with classical and quantum mechanics, respectively. The latter result is obtained in a purely formal way, but it can be provided with a physical meaning by adopting a recent interpretation of quantum mechanics that reinterprets quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. Hence quantum logic can be considered as a mathematical structure formalizing the properties of the notion of verification in quantum physics. This conclusion supports the general idea that some nonclassical logics can coexist without conflicting with classical logic (global pluralism) because they formalize metalinguistic notions that do not coincide with the notion of truth as correspondence but are not alternative to it either. (shrink)

The Geneva–Brussels approach to quantum mechanics (QM) and the semantic realism (SR) nonstandard interpretation of QM exhibit some common features and some deep conceptual differences. We discuss in this paper two elementary models provided in the two approaches as intuitive supports to general reasonings and as a proof of consistency of general assumptions, and show that Aerts’ quantum machine can be embodied into a macroscopic version of the microscopic SR model, overcoming the seeming incompatibility between the two models. This result (...) provides some hints for the construction of a unified perspective in which the two approaches can be properly placed. (shrink)

One of the authors has recently propounded an SR model which shows, circumventing known no-go theorems, that an objective interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible. We consider here compound physical systems and show why the proofs of nonlocality of QM do not hold within the SR model, which is slightly simplified in this paper. We also discuss quantum measurement theory within this model, note that the objectification problem disappears since the measurement of any property simply reveals its unknown value, and (...) show that the projection postulate can be considered as an approximate law, valid FAPP. Finally, we provide an intuitive picture that justifies some unusual features of the SR model and proves its consistency. (shrink)

The extended semantic realism (ESR) model proposes a new theoretical perspective which embodies the mathematical formalism of standard (Hilbert space) quantum mechanics (QM) into a noncontextual framework, reinterpreting quantum probabilities as conditional instead of absolute. We provide in this review an overall view on the present status of our research on this topic. We attain in a new, shortened way a mathematical representation of the generalized observables introduced by the ESR model and a generalization of the projection postulate of elementary (...) QM. Basing on these results we prove that the Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (BCHSH) inequality, a modified BCHSH inequality and quantum predictions hold together in the ESR model because they refer to different parts of the picture of the physical world supplied by the model. Then we show that a new mathematical representation of mixtures must be introduced in the ESR model which does not coincide with the standard representation in QM and avoids some deep problems that arise from the representation of mixtures provided by QM. Finally we get a nontrivial generalization of the Lüders postulate, which is justified in a special case by introducing a reasonable physical assumption on the evolution of the compound system made up of the measured system and the measuring apparatus. (shrink)

Scholars concerned with the foundations of quantum mechanics (QM) usually think that contextuality (hence nonobjectivity of physical properties, which implies numerous problems and paradoxes) is an unavoidable feature of QM which directly follows from the mathematical apparatus of QM. Based on some previous papers on this issue, we criticize this view and supply a new informal presentation of the extended semantic realism (ESR) model which embodies the formalism of QM into a broader mathematical formalism and reinterprets quantum probabilities as conditional (...) on detection rather than absolute. Because of this reinterpretation a hidden variables theory can be constructed which justifies the assumptions introduced in the ESR model and proves its objectivity. When applied to special cases the ESR model settles long-standing conflicts (it reconciles Bell’s inequalities with QM), provides a general framework in which previous results obtained by other authors (as local interpretations of the GHZ experiment) are recovered and explained, and supports an interpretation of quantum logic which avoids the introduction of the problematic notion of quantum truth. (shrink)

The old Bohr–Einstein debate about the completeness of quantum mechanics (QM) was held on an ontological ground. The completeness problem becomes more tractable, however, if it is preliminarily discussed from a semantic viewpoint. Indeed every physical theory adopts, explicitly or not, a truth theory for its observative language, in terms of which the notions of semantic objectivity and semantic completeness of the physical theory can be introduced and inquired. In particular, standard QM adopts a verificationist theory of truth that implies (...) its semantic nonobjectivity; moreover, we show in this paper that standard QM is semantically complete, which matches Bohr's thesis. On the other hand, one of the authors has provided a Semantic Realism (or SR) interpretation of QM that adopts a Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence for the observative language of QM (which was previously mantained to be impossible); according to this interpretation QM is semantically objective, yet incomplete, which matches EPR's thesis. Thus, standard QM and the SR interpretation of QM come to opposite conclusions. These can be reconciled within an integrationist perspective that interpretes non-Tarskian theories of truth as theories of metalinguistic concepts different from truth. (shrink)

The belief that quantum mechanics does not admit a realistic interpretation is widespread. According to some scholars concerned with the foundations of QM all existing interpretations of this theory presuppose instead a form of realism which consists in assuming that QM deals with individual objects and their properties. We uphold in the present paper that the arguments supporting the contextuality and the nonlocality of QM are a significant clue to the implicit adoption of stronger forms of realism. If these kinds (...) of realism are substituted by a simpler and more intuitive semantic realism one can contrive a noncontextual and local interpretation of the formalism of QM. Moreover one can provide a model for such an interpretation in which local realism and QM do not conflict and some fundamental problems of the standard interpretation of QM are avoided. (shrink)