The study of the problem of argumentative bullshit can be useful to shed some light on the practice of argumentation and the essence of argumentative virtues. Since argumentative bullshit is arguably the greatest threat to argumentation, and it is characterised by an indifference to the constitutive value of argumentation (supporting a claim with reasons), argumentative virtue could be understood as the opposite to that indifference: caring about the practice of argumentation and being disposed to sustain and improve it through their (...) participation in it. Whoever produces argumentative bullshit cares more about certain external ends (reputation, political goals, making fun…) than about argumentative practice, whereas virtuous arguers never lose sight of the value of the argumentative practice. This suggests a MacIntyrean conception of the practice of argumentation, according to which argumentation is a practice with internal goods than can only be recognised and achieved through participation in it, while argumentative virtues are those traits conducive to the appreciation and achievement of argumentative goods. (shrink)