Despite Glouberman—s paper, I adhere to the terms I used earlier to describe the contest between Descartes and Gassendi (and their followers—which was the major part of my argument, unexamined by Glouberman). His attribution to me of a positivist conception of philosophical activity, I claim, better characterizes his own attitude toward evidence, truth, and the cognitive significance of metaphysical claims. Part of what was at stake between Descartes and Gassendi was a communal model of knowledge; within this context, I raise (...) questions about standards of scholarship and their significance. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess the central role the imagination acquires in Pierre Gassendi’s logic. I trace the structuring scheme of the three acts of the mind—common to a good number of late scholastic and early modern logics—to the Thomistic notion of the movement of reasoning in knowledge and argue that Gassendi revisits this notion in his logic. The three acts scheme is from the beginning a bridge between logic and the natural philosophical treatment of the soul. (...) I show how Gassendi’s take on the three acts is similarly poised between his Logic and his Physics and I discuss the rationale, sources and consequences of his attribution of the three acts to the imagination. I argue for the following points: Gassendi’s conception of the logical role of the imagination answers to his empiricist epistemology, his naturalized view of the mind and his notion of a natural logic; it is also operative in his pairing of the formal mechanism of logical operations with a progressive mechanism of the operations of the mind; and it serves as a counterpart to his experimental understanding of the progress of knowledge.1. (shrink)

This essay examines how eighteenth-century naturalists selected, read, and used textual and visual sources of the past to construct chronologies of the aurora borealis from antiquity to their present. Frequent sightings of the northern lights in Europe from 1707 onward prompted investigations into not only their physical properties but also their historical patterns. These searches encountered a twofold problem. Because the term “aurora borealis” was a seventeenth-century neologism, the recovery of auroras avant la lettre required discerning them amid the various (...) aerial spectacles described in older records. Further complicating the task was the eighteenth-century authors’ suspicion of these documents as tainted by the superstitions of an “unenlightened” past. Nevertheless, these self-proclaimed “enlightened” commentators relied on the very sources they criticized in their search for lost auroras. The essay investigates how different Enlightenment auroral observers fashioned their own criteria for identifying “true” auroras through practices of extricating verbal and visual descriptions in older sources from their original contexts of portentous interpretation. (shrink)