Purрose of the рaрer is to emphasize affinity and succession in the aррroaches of Descartes and Kierkegaard to the interpretation of key factors of their philosophical search. It could be implemented through understanding such viewpoints of both thinkers as a) appropriate reasons for human existence; b) possible factors for human freedom as a condition of self-actualization; c) original approach to prove the existence of God. Theoretical basis. The use of phenomenology and hermeneutics enable us to comprehend the key philosopher’s ideas (...) as the manifestation of their personalities. Originality. The author believes that it is quite right to refer to the philosophy of the early modern period as a form of its demand fulfillment for human development. An essential prerequisite for revealing the toрic of the article is a focus on the latest investigations of Descartes’ philosophy, which demonstrate the anthropological significance. Since Kierkegaard’s viewpoint was developed through depersonalized understanding of philosophy, related motives of their thoughts are expressed by emphasizing their personal motives of philosophizing. This affinity is reflected firstly, in distancing from depersonalized and dehumanized world view; secondly, in religion-oriented search and proof of God’s existence based on human nature. Conclusions. Due to the modern state of historical and philosophical science, it is possible to argue that Descartes and Kierkegaard had content-related philosophizing motives, which are close to current search. Interpreting Descartes’ anthropological project by Kierkegaard, the author states the accepted determining influence of Hegel’s philosophy interpretation in general and his interpretation of Descartes, in particular. This argument allows to understand Kierkegaard’s search as Hegel’s deconstruction, because further uncritical retention and reproduction of his viewpoints are evaluated as a threat to fulfill human spiritual calling. A common and important thing in the views of both thinkers is their strong interest in individual and personal aspects of human nature as a constituent factor of God’s existence. (shrink)

Descartes developed an elaborate theory of animal physiology that he used to explain functionally organized, situationally adapted behavior in both human and nonhuman animals. Although he restricted true mentality to the human soul, I argue that he developed a purely mechanistic (or material) ‘psychology’ of sensory, motor, and low-level cognitive functions. In effect, he sought to mechanize the offices of the Aristotelian sensitive soul. He described the basic mechanisms in the Treatise on man, which he summarized in the Discourse. However, (...) the Passions of the soul contains his most ambitious claims for purely material brain processes. These claims arise in abstract discussions of the functions of the passions and in illustrations of those functions. Accordingly, after providing an intellectual context for Descartes’s theory of the passions, especially by comparison with that of Tho- mas Aquinas, I examine its ‘machine psychology’, including the role of habituation and association. I contend that Descartes put forth what may reasonably be called a ‘psychology’ of the unensouled animal body and, correspondingly, of the human body when the soul does not intervene. He thus conceptually distinguished a mechanistically explicable sensory and motor psychology, common to nonhuman and human animals, from true mentality involving higher cognition and volition and requiring (in his view) an immaterial mind. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo ofrece razones iniciales para interpretar en forma dia-léctica las “pruebas de la existencia divina” que Descartes ofrece en sus Meditaciones III y V. Primero indico algunos precedentes entre los comentaristas contemporáneos y señalo cómo esa manera de abordar los problemas funda-mentales arranca en los clásicos griegos. Después muestro cómo un procedi-miento dialéctico podría resolver un conjunto de problemas que, en principio, incluye el tradicional “círculo cartesiano”. Por último, intento mostrar que no es impensable atribuirle a Descartes una (...) argumentación metafísica del tipo indicado; para ello, esgrimo un pequeño conjunto de argumentos textuales. Mi conclusión es que este tipo de interpretaciones merecen explorarse con mayor esmero.: This paper intends to sketch an initial reason for reading in a dialec-tical way the “proofs of God’s existence” in Descartes’ Meditations, III and V. I begin by indicating antecedents for this kind of interpretation among com-mentators, and show how this approach towards basic philosophical prob-lems can be traced to the Greek classics. I then try to explain how this ar-gumentative procedure can afford in principle a solution to the well-known riddle of the “Cartesian circle”, among other related issues. Finally, I discuss a small set of textual points and show that attributing a dialectical character to Descartes’ main metaphysical arguments should not be taken to be implausi-ble at all. I conclude that interpretations of this kind deserve a more careful exploration. (shrink)

Descartes’s uncompromising rejection of the possibility of animal intelligence was among his most controversial theses. That rejection is based on (1) his commitment to the doctrine of animal automatism and (2) two tests that he takes to be sufficient indicators of thought (the action and language tests). Of these two tests, only the language test is truly definitive, and Descartes is firmly of the view that no animal could demonstrate the capacity to use signs to convey meaning in “all the (...) circumstances of life.” The topic is fascinating for forcing us to ponder what exactly reason is for Descartes and the role it plays in everyday life. This article explores the tensions in Descartes’s arguments produced by an over reliance on the analogy between animals and clocks, including the question of what to make of Descartes’s recognition of the need to posit representational and information-processing subsystems in the brain. (shrink)

This chapter examines the mechanistic psychology of Descartes in the _Passions_, while also drawing on the _Treatise on Man_. It develops the idea of a Cartesian “psychology” that relies on purely bodily mechanisms by showing that he explained some behaviorally appropriate responses through bodily mechanisms alone and that he envisioned the tailoring of such responses to environmental circumstances through a purely corporeal “memory.” An animal’s adjustment of behavior as caused by recurring patterns of sensory stimulation falls under the notion of (...) “learning,” behavioristically conceived. Indeed, Descartes’s animal-machine hypothesis may well be a distant ancestor to Watsonian behaviorism, via T. H. Huxley (1884). The final two sections of the chapter take stock of what psychological capacities Descartes ascribed to mind, body, or both, and consider those capacities that we might now plausibly construe as being explicable by nonmentalistic mechanisms as opposed to those that at present remain unreducedly mentalistic. -/- This chapter derives from a lecture delivered at the University of King's College (Halifax, Nova Scotia) as part of a year-long series on Descartes and the Modern. The lecture series was co-sponsored by the programs in History of Science and Early Modern and Contemporary Studies. (shrink)