ABSTRACT: Hobbes belonged to philosophical and scientific circles grappling with the big question at the dawn of modern physics: materialism and its consequences for morality. ‘Matter in motion’ may be a core principle of this materialism but it is certainly inadequate to capture the whole project. In wave after wave of this debate the Epicurean view of a fully determined universe governed by natural laws, that nevertheless allows to humans a sphere of libertas, but does not require a creator god (...) or teleology to explain it, comes up against monotheism and its insistence on the incoherence of an ordered world in the absence of a God and his purposes. The following questions were central to this debate: Can we understand the universe as law-governed in the absence of a god? If so, what room is there in a fully determined mechanical universe for human freedom? If humans do enjoy freedom, does the same hold for other animals? Is this freedom compatible with standard views of morality? (shrink)

Diachronic emergence has recently been characterised as transformation. This aims to capture the thought that the entities that emerge are radically new or different. Transformation is hence closely linked with a central (but rarely raised) challenge for all emergentists: how to account for the identity and individuation of entities involved in emergence. With this challenge in view, I develop and probe four interpretations of transformation: addition, replacement, fusion, and transubstantiation. Of those, transubstantiation provides the most plausible response to the challenge (...) about identity. Accordingly, diachronic emergence is a transformative process whereby an individual passes from one primary kind to another. (shrink)

The article discusses the accusation advanced by Plutarch and Cicero, according to which the Epicureans are unjust, as they would break the law to pursue pleasure if certain of impunity, and deals with this criticism by analyzing the Epicurean theory of law and justice and comparing it with friendship. The article argues that, from a doctrinal standpoint, philia has a higher place in the Epicurean’s priorities and a stronger efficacy than positive law in serving the naturally just. It thus concludes (...) that, as Plutarch and Cicero suspected, the Epicurean’s ultimate loyalty does not lie with positive law, in spite of its importance for social order, but rather with the naturally just, better secured by friendship. (shrink)

The article investigates how Diogenes of Oenoanda in his huge 2nd cent. AD Epicurean wall inscription deals with the control of fear. It argues for restoring the fragmentary title of Diogenes’ Ethics–treatise with “feelings [of soul] and [body]”. In this way the importance given in Ethics to the evaluation of our feelings according to the Epicurean doctrine is reflected in the title. Diogenes in his introduction to the whole inscription lists up the control of irrational fears in the first place (...) of achievements of Epicureanism. The analysis of the relevant passages on his Ethics results in assigning fr. 47 III–IV and NF 137 to a subsection dealing with fear of pain from diseases which on the inscription must have followed fr. 48. Fear from gods is abundantly discussed in the recently combined Theological Physics Sequence. The article argues, that this topic was not treated once more in Ethics. Indeed, the “unclear fear” mentioned in fr. 35 refers, as a comparison with Epic. Ep. Hdt. 81–82 and Phld. De Dis I shows, not to some sort of feeling triggered by wrong tales on gods, but to an irrational fear of death. (shrink)

Sextus Empiricus ascribes to Epicurus a curious account of truth and falsehood, according to which these characteristics belong to things in the world about which one speaks, not to what one says about them. I propose an interpretation that takes this account seriously and explains the connection between truth and existence that the Epicureans also seem to recognise. I then examine a second Epicurean account of truth and falsehood and show how it is related to the first.

InFam.13.1 Cicero, visiting Athens en route to Cilicia in the summer of 51b.c., writes to C. Memmius L.f., praetor in 58 but by the time of Cicero's communication an exile in Athens after the shambolic consular elections for 53; Memmius was (temporarily, one assumes) absent from Athens in Mytilene, hence the need for Cicero to write to him. This letter, along withAtt.5.11.6 and 19.3, is our focus in the argument that follows, but, to summarize the situation in the very broadest (...) terms, Cicero's concern in it is with Memmius’ intentions regarding a plot of land in Athens occupied by a house of Epicurus, and with the objections to Memmius’ plans that had been raised with Cicero by the scholarch of the Epicurean community in Athens, Patro. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to feelings (pathē) as criteria of truth and criteria of choice and avoidance in Epicureanism. The first section reviews two features of the other two Epicurean criteria of truth, perceptions and preconceptions: their non-rational and evident character. The second section extends the account to feelings, showing how, on the basis of their non-rational and evident character, feelings can be used to gain insights. The third section of the paper finally turns to feelings as criteria of choice (...) and avoidance. It examines some neglected textual evidence that shows that perceptions and feelings are closely connected to each other, that is, that Epicurean feelings are defined as perceptions and observances of themselves, shedding some new light on the joint role of feelings and perceptions in choices and avoidances. (shrink)

In this paper I revisit nature as a source of normativity for law in the later Hellenistic period, that is beyond the opposition of law and nature in the early classical period, Plato’s and Aristotle’s naturalism, or the early Stoics’ conception of the common law. I will focus on the first century BCE, when the expression ‘natural law’ gained prominence, reconstructing its origins in the interaction between Hellenistic philosophers and the Roman elite, including jurists. I argue that for the jurists (...) the Stoic doctrine of law in nature offered a theoretical underpinning for their unique practice of dispute resolution, whereas for the Stoics this Roman practice offered an unexpected opportunity to instrumentalise their conception of law. (shrink)

The article investigates how Diogenes of Oenoanda in his huge 2ndcent. AD Epicurean wall inscription deals with the control of fear. It argues for restoring the fragmentary title of Diogenes’Ethics–treatise with “feelings [of soul] and [body]”. In this way the importance given inEthicsto the evaluation of our feelings according to the Epicurean doctrine is reflected in the title. Diogenes in his introduction to the whole inscription lists up the control of irrational fears in the first place of achievements of Epicureanism. (...) The analysis of the relevant passages on hisEthicsresults in assigning fr. 47 III–IV and NF 137 to a subsection dealing with fear of pain from diseases which on the inscription must have followed fr. 48. Fear from gods is abundantly discussed in the recently combinedTheological Physics Sequence. The article argues, that this topic was not treated once more inEthics. Indeed, the “unclear fear” mentioned in fr. 35 (Ethics) refers, as a comparison with Epic.Ep. Hdt. 81–82 and Phld.De DisI shows, not to some sort of feeling triggered by wrong tales on gods, but to an irrational fear of death. (shrink)