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Assertion

Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465 (1965)

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  1. Proof and Falsity: A Logical Investigation, by Nils Kürbis. [REVIEW]Lavinia Picollo - 2021 - Analysis 81:595–599.
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  • The Logical Significance of Assertion: Frege on the Essence of Logic.Walter B. Pedriali - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (8).
    Assertion plays a crucial dual role in Frege's conception of logic, a formal and a transcendental one. A recurrent complaint is that Frege's inclusion of the judgement-stroke in the Begriffsschrift is either in tension with his anti-psychologism or wholly superfluous. Assertion, the objection goes, is at best of merely psychological significance. In this paper, I defend Frege against the objection by giving reasons for recognising the central logical significance of assertion in both its formal and its transcendental role.
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  • Lewis Carroll’s regress and the presuppositional structure of arguments.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (1):1-38.
    This essay argues that the main lesson of Lewis Carroll's Regress is that arguments are constitutively presuppositional.
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  • On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did not Believe or Want ….Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):96-119.
    Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg-raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not-p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to (...)
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  • The Frege–Geach Problem, Modus Ponens, and Legal Language.Vitaly Ogleznev - 2018 - Problemos 93.
    [full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] This paper proposes a new pragmatic interpretation of the Frege–Geach problem and presents a possible solution using a model of ascriptive legal language. The first section includes the definition of the Frege–Geach problem. In the second section, I analyze the content of Geach’s critical argument against prescriptivism in ethics. I discuss what Geach means by ascriptivism, why he mixes it with prescriptivism, and why a particular article by Herbert Hart became the (...)
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  • Moral fictionalism versus the rest.Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
    In this paper we introduce a distinct metaethical position, fictionalism about morality. We clarify and defend the position, showing that it is a way to save the 'moral phenomena' while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, we distinguish moral fictionalism from moral quasi-realism, and we show that fictionalism possesses the virtues of quasi-realism about morality, but avoids its vices.
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  • The Authority of Expressive Self-Ascriptions*: Dialogue.A. Minh Nguyen - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (1):103-.
    ABSTRACT: What explains first-person authority? What explains the presumption that an utterance is true when it is a sincere intelligible determinate first-person singular simple present-tense ascription of intentional state? According to Rockney Jacobsen, self-ascriptions each enjoy a presumption of truth because they are systematically reliable. They are systematically reliable because they are typically both truth-assessable and expressive. Such self-ascriptions, if sincere, are certain to be true. This article presents a defence and a critique of Jacobsen's theory. It is argued that (...)
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  • Reasons and character.Sophia R. Moreau - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):272-305.
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  • Diaphonic pluralism: from truth pluralism to disagreement pluralism.Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-28.
    In this paper, I offer a pluralistic framework for disagreement and I develop a strategy to account for the varieties of disagreement on the basis of the varieties of the truth across different domains of discourse. Truth-pluralism is thus sufficient for delivering pluralism about disagreement—that is, diaphonic pluralism.
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  • Thinking and being by IradKimhiCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018, Hbk. $39.95, 176pp. ISBN 978‐0‐674‐96789‐2. [REVIEW]Steven J. Methven - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):809-813.
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  • Sem'ntica Expressivista.Wilson Mendonça - 2016 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (1):154-179.
    O programa semântico do expressivismo surgiu como uma tentativa de fundamentar a visão não-cognitivista do discurso ético, mas logo foi generalizado de forma a cobrir a linguagem normativa em geral. Ele promete desenvolver uma alternativa global à abordagem clássica da semântica das condições de verdade: uma teoria não factualista, baseada na pragmática, do significado linguístico. Os expressivistas veem o conteúdo das sentenças normativas como determinado por seu uso primário, que é não-descritivo. As versões tradicionais da semântica expressivista procedem associando sistematicamente (...)
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  • Wittgenstein, Ramsey and British Pragmatism.Mathieu Marion - 2012 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2).
    In this paper, I examine the transmission of some ideas of the pragmatist tradition to Wittgenstein, in his ‘middle period,’ through the intermediary of F. P. Ramsey, with whom he had numerous fruitful discussions at Cambridge in 1929. I argue more specifically that one must first come to terms with Ramsey’s own views in 1929, and explain how they differ from views expressed in earlier papers from 1925-27, so a large part of this paper is devoted to this task. One (...)
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  • On Redrawing the Force-Content Distinction.Christian Georg Martin - 2019 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 8 (1-2):175-208.
    Frege distinguished the thought qua logical content from the assertoric force attached to it when judged to be true. The gist of this distinction is captured by the so-called Frege-Geach point. Recently, several authors have drawn inspiration from Wittgenstein to reject this point and the distinction it is based on. This article proceeds from the observation that Wittgenstein himself did not reject the force-content distinction but urged us to reformulate it in a non-dualistic way. While drawing on Wittgensteinian lessons about (...)
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  • Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason, by Susanne Mantel.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):983-990.
    Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason, by MantelSusanne. New York and London: Routledge, 2018. Pp. xiii + 190.
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  • Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.Benjamin Lennertz - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):184-208.
    This paper makes explicit the way in which many theorists of the epistemology of uncertainty, or formal epistemologists, are committed to a version of noncognitivism—one about thoughts that something is likely. It does so by drawing an analogy with metaethical noncognitivism. I explore the degree to which the motivations for both views are similar and how both views have to grapple with the Frege‐Geach Problem about complex thoughts. The major upshot of recognizing this noncognitivism is that it presents challenges and (...)
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  • Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste.Peter Lasersohn - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.
    This paper argues that truth values of sentences containing predicates of “personal taste” such as fun or tasty must be relativized to individuals. This relativization is of truth value only, and does not involve a relativization of semantic content: If you say roller coasters are fun, and I say they are not, I am negating the same content which you assert, and directly contradicting you. Nonetheless, both our utterances can be true (relative to their separate contexts). A formal semantic theory (...)
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  • Supposition: A Problem for Bilateralism.Nils Kürbis - 2023 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 53 (3):301-327.
    In bilateral logic formulas are signed by + and –, indicating the speech acts assertion and denial. I argue that making an assumption is also speech act. Speech acts cannot be embedded within other speech acts. Hence we cannot make sense of the notion of making an assumption in bilateral logic. Attempts to solve this problem are considered and rejected.
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  • Hart and the Metaphysics and Semantics of Legal Normativity.Matthew H. Kramer - 2018 - Ratio Juris 31 (4):396-420.
    A number of philosophers in recent years have maintained that H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law propounded an expressivist account of the semantics of the legal statements that are uttered from the internal viewpoint of the people who run the institutions of legal governance in any jurisdiction. Although the primary aim of this article is to attack the attribution of that semantic doctrine to Hart, the article will begin with some metaphysical matters—the matters of reductionism and naturalism—that (...)
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  • Perspectival representation and fallacies in metaethics.Max Kölbel - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):379-404.
    The prevailing theoretical framework for theorising about representation construes all representation as involving objective representational contents. This classic framework has tended to drive philosophers either to claim that evaluative judgements are representations and therefore objective, or else to claim that evaluative judgements are not really representations, because they are not objective. However, a more general, already well-explored framework is available, which will allow theorists to treat evaluative judgements as full-fledged representations while leaving open whether they are objective. Such a more (...)
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  • Moral fictionalism, the Frege-Geach problem, and reasonable inference.Markeli Kalderon - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):133-143.
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  • Moral fictionalism, the Frege-Geach problem, and reasonable inference.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):133-143.
    CHANGE SLIDE Go through outline of talk CHANGE SLIDE It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims. Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral utterances; and, hence, that our (...)
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  • Proper Function and Ethical Judgment Towards A Biosemantic Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse.Drew Johnson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2867-2891.
    This paper employs Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of representation to develop a proposal about the function of ethical claims and judgments. I propose that ethical claims and judgments (or ethical ‘affirmations’) have the function of simultaneously tracking the morally salient features of social situations and directing behavior that coordinates in a collectively beneficial way around those features. Thus, ethical affirmations count as a species of what Millikan labels ‘Pushmi-Pullyu’ representations that simultaneously have a descriptive and a directive direction of fit. (...)
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  • Proper Function and Ethical Judgment Towards A Biosemantic Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse.Drew Johnson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2867-2891.
    This paper employs Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of representation to develop a proposal about the function of ethical claims and judgments. I propose that ethical claims and judgments (or ethical ‘affirmations’) have the function of simultaneously tracking the morally salient features of social situations and directing behavior that coordinates in a collectively beneficial way around those features. Thus, ethical affirmations count as a species of what Millikan labels ‘Pushmi-Pullyu’ representations that simultaneously have a descriptive and a directive direction of fit. (...)
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  • Are explicit performatives assertions?Mark Jary - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (2):207 - 234.
    This paper contributes to the study of explicit performative utterances in the following ways. First, it presents arguments that support Austin’s view that these utterances are not assertions. In doing so, it offers an original explanation of why they cannot be true or false. Second, it puts forward a new analysis of explicit performatives as cases of showing performing, rather than of instances of asserting or declaring that one is performing a particular act. Finally, it develops a new account of (...)
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  • Self-quotation and self-knowledge.Rockney Jacobsen - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):419-445.
    I argue that indirect quotation in the first person simple present tense (self-quotation) provides a class of infallible assertions. The defense of this conclusion examines the joint descriptive and constitutive functions of performative utterances and argues that a parallel treatment of belief ascription is in order. The parallel account yields a class of infallible belief ascriptions that makes no appeal to privileged modes of access. Confronting a dilemma formulated by Crispin Wright for theories of self-knowledge gives an epistemological setting for (...)
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  • Locke, expressivism, conditionals.F. Jackson & P. Pettit - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):86-92.
    The sentence ‘x is square’ might have had different truth conditions from those it in fact has. It might have had no truth conditions at all. Its having truth conditions and its having the ones it has rest on empirical facts about our use of ‘x is square’. What empirical facts? Any answer that goes into detail is inevitably highly controversial, but we think that there is a rough answer that is, by philosophers’ standards, relatively uncontroversial. It goes back to (...)
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  • Truth and Falsity in Communication: Assertion, Denial, and Interpretation.Kensuke Ito - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):1-18.
    Our linguistic communication is, in part, the exchange of truths. It is an empirical fact that in daily conversation we aim at truths, not falsehoods. This fact may lead us to assume that ordinary, assertion-based communication is the only possible communicative system for truth-apt information exchange, or at least has priority over any alternatives. This assumption is underwritten in three traditional doctrines: that assertion is a basic notion, in terms of which we define denial; that to predicate truth of a (...)
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  • Weak Assertion.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):741-770.
    We present an inferentialist account of the epistemic modal operator might. Our starting point is the bilateralist programme. A bilateralist explains the operator not in terms of the speech act of rejection ; we explain the operator might in terms of weak assertion, a speech act whose existence we argue for on the basis of linguistic evidence. We show that our account of might provides a solution to certain well-known puzzles about the semantics of modal vocabulary whilst retaining classical logic. (...)
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  • Geach’s Categorial Grammar.Lloyd Humberstone - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):281 - 317.
    Geach’s rich paper ‘A Program for Syntax’ introduced many ideas into the arena of categorial grammar, not all of which have been given the attention they warrant in the thirty years since its first publication. Rather surprisingly, one of our findings (Section 3 below) is that the paper not only does not contain a statement of what has widely come to be known as “Geach’s Rule”, but in fact presents considerations which are inimical to the adoption of the rule in (...)
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  • Unity and the Frege–Geach problem.Christopher Hom & Jeremy Schwartz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):15-24.
    The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory is successful, then there is a plausible extension of it that readily solves the Frege–Geach problem for normative propositions. Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, but it (...)
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  • Pejoratives.Christopher Hom - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):164-185.
    The norms surrounding pejorative language, such as racial slurs and swear words, are deeply prohibitive. Pejoratives are typically a means for speakers to express their derogatory attitudes. As these attitudes vary along many dimensions and magnitudes, they initially appear to be resistant to a truth-conditional, semantic analysis. The goal of the paper is to clarify the essential linguistic phenomena surrounding pejoratives, survey the logical space of explanatory theories, evaluate each with respect to the phenomena and provide a preliminary assessment of (...)
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  • Neutral Predication.Thomas Hodgson - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1381-1389.
    Hanks has defended a novel account of what propositions are. His key argument against Soames' rival view is that predication is not neutral. According to Hanks, predication is essentially committal. I show that Hanks' argument for this conclusion raises problems for his own account of questions and orders.
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  • Act‐type theories of propositions.Thomas Hodgson - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11).
    Many philosophers believe in things, propositions, which are the things that we believe, assert etc., and which are the contents of sentences. The act-type theory of propositions is an attempt to say what propositions are, to explain how we stand in relations to them, and to explain why they are true or false. The core idea of the act-type theory is that propositions are types of acts of predication. The theory is developed in various ways to offer explanations of the (...)
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  • A forgotten logical expressivist: Strawson’s philosophy of logic and its challenges.Sybren Heyndels - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.
    P.F. Strawson contributed to many philosophical domains, including the philosophy of language, the history of philosophy, metaphysics, moral philosophy and philosophical methodology. Most of his contributions in these areas have influenced contemporary debates, either because his views are still defended or because they are still considered worthy of detailed responses. His views on the philosophy of logic have been only rarely discussed, however. My aim in this paper is threefold. First, I provide a systematic account of Strawson’s philosophy of logic. (...)
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  • Need anything follow from a contradiction?Simon Thomas Hewitt - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):278-297.
    ABSTRACT Classical and intuitionistic logic both validate Ex Contradictione Quodlibet, according to which any proposition whatsoever follows from a contradiction. Many philosophers have found ECQ counter-intuitive, but criticisms of the principle have almost universally been directed from a position of support for relevance or other orthodox paraconsistent logics, according to which some, but not necessarily all, propositions follow from a contradiction. This paper draws attention to the historically significant view that nothing whatsoever follows from a contradiction – Ex Contradictione Nihil. (...)
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  • Negation, denial and falsity: Logic's negative trio.Simon Hewitt - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):109-117.
    Negation, denial and falsity lie at the heart of debates about logic. We set out the classical account of the relationship between negation and denial, owing to Frege and Geach. We then challenge this on the basis that it does not permit an adequate account of falsity. A dialetheic alternative is minuted and criticised before a novel rejectivist account is proposed according to which falsity is the aim of the speech‐act of denial, whilst negation embeds deniability into assertoric contexts.
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  • The Birth of Semantics.Richard Kimberly Heck & Robert C. May - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (6):1-31.
    We attempt here to trace the evolution of Frege’s thought about truth. What most frames the way we approach the problem is a recognition that hardly any of Frege’s most familiar claims about truth appear in his earliest work. We argue that Frege’s mature views about truth emerge from a fundamental re-thinking of the nature of logic instigated, in large part, by a sustained engagement with the work of George Boole and his followers, after the publication of Begriffsschrift and the (...)
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  • The Composition of Thoughts.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):126-166.
    Are Fregean thoughts compositionally complex and composed of senses? We argue that, in Begriffsschrift, Frege took 'conceptual contents' to be unstructured, but that he quickly moved away from this position, holding just two years later that conceptual contents divide of themselves into 'function' and 'argument'. This second position is shown to be unstable, however, by Frege's famous substitution puzzle. For Frege, the crucial question the puzzle raises is why "The Morning Star is a planet" and "The Evening Star is a (...)
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  • More on 'A Liar Paradox'.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.
    A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox".
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  • Semantic expressivism for epistemic modals.Peter Hawke & Shane Steinert-Threlkeld - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (2):475-511.
    Expressivists about epistemic modals deny that ‘Jane might be late’ canonically serves to express the speaker’s acceptance of a certain propositional content. Instead, they hold that it expresses a lack of acceptance. Prominent expressivists embrace pragmatic expressivism: the doxastic property expressed by a declarative is not helpfully identified with that sentence’s compositional semantic value. Against this, we defend semantic expressivism about epistemic modals: the semantic value of a declarative from this domain is the property of doxastic attitudes it canonically serves (...)
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  • Cognitivism, non-cognitivism, and skepticism about folk psychology.James Harold - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):165 - 185.
    In recent years it has become more and more difficult to distinguish between metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. For example, proponents of the minimalist theory of truth hold that moral claims need not express beliefs in order to be (minimally) truth-apt, and yet some of these proponents still reject the traditional cognitivist analysis of moral language and thought. Thus, the dispute in metaethics between cognitivists and non-cognitivists has come to be seen as a dispute over the correct way to characterize our (...)
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  • Between intrinsic and extrinsic value.James Harold - 2005 - Journal of Social Philosophy 36 (1):85–105.
    Moral philosophers who differ from one another on a wide range of questions tend to agree on at least one general point. Most believe that things are worth valuing either because of their relationship to something else worth valuing, or because they are simply (in themselves) worth valuing. I value my car, because I value getting to work; I value getting to work, because I value making money and spending time productively; and I value those things because I value leading (...)
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  • The Content–Force Distinction.Peter W. Hanks - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):141-164.
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  • Thinking and Being, by Irad Kimhi.Adrian Haddock - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):974-983.
    _ Thinking and Being _, by KimhiIrad. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. Pp. xx + 166.
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  • The judgement-stroke as a truth-operator: A new interpretation of the logical form of sentences in Frege's scientific language.D. Greimann - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (2):213-238.
    The syntax of Frege's scientific language is commonly taken to be characterized by two oddities: the representation of the intended illocutionary role of sentences by a special sign, the judgement-stroke, and the treatment of sentences as a species of singular terms. In this paper, an alternative view is defended. The main theses are: the syntax of Frege's scientific language aims at an explication of the logical form of judgements; the judgement-stroke is, therefore, a truth-operator, not a pragmatic operator; in Frege's (...)
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  • Illocutionary force and semantic content.Mitchell S. Green - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):435-473.
    Illocutionary force and semantic content are widely held to occupy utterly different categories in at least two ways: Any expression serving as an indicator of illocutionary force must be without semantic content, and no such expression can embed. A refined account of the force/content distinction is offered here that does the explanatory work that the standard distinction does, while, in accounting for the behavior of a range of parenthetical expressions, shows neither nor to be compulsory. The refined account also motivates (...)
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  • Frege's puzzle about the cognitive function of truth.Dirk Greimann - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):425-442.
    The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to be completely redundant (...)
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  • Unassertion.Laurence Goldstein - 1988 - Philosophia 18 (1):119-121.
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  • Generalized Update Semantics.Simon Goldstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):795-835.
    This paper explores the relationship between dynamic and truth conditional semantics for epistemic modals. It provides a generalization of a standard dynamic update semantics for modals. This new semantics derives a Kripke semantics for modals and a standard dynamic semantics for modals as special cases. The semantics allows for new characterizations of a variety of principles in modal logic, including the inconsistency of ‘p and might not p’. Finally, the semantics provides a construction procedure for transforming any truth conditional semantics (...)
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  • You gotta do what you gotta do.John Gibbons - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):157-177.
    One question about the role of the mental in the determination of practical reason concerns the pro-attitudes: can any set of beliefs, without the help of a desire, rationalize or make reasonable a desire, intention, attempt, or intentional action? After criticizing Michael Smith’s argument for a negative answer to this question, I present two arguments in favor of a positive answer. Another question about the role of the mental in the determination of practical reason concerns belief: what gives you a (...)
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