Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Towards a logic for ‘because’.Eric Raidl & Hans Rott - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-31.
    This paper explores the connective ‘because’, based on the idea that ‘CbecauseA’ implies the acceptance/truth of the antecedentAas well as of the consequentC, and additionally that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. To capture this idea of difference-making a ‘relevantized’ version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed that takes the antecedent to be relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is true/accepted in a state$$\sigma $$σjust in case (i) the consequent is true/accepted when$$\sigma (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • How Theories of Induction Can Streamline Measurements of Scientific Performance.Slobodan Perović & Vlasta Sikimić - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (2):267-291.
    We argue that inductive analysis and operational assessment of the scientific process can be justifiably and fruitfully brought together, whereby the citation metrics used in the operational analysis can effectively track the inductive dynamics and measure the research efficiency. We specify the conditions for the use of such inductive streamlining, demonstrate it in the cases of high energy physics experimentation and phylogenetic research, and propose a test of the method’s applicability.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.
    – We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Framework for Pragmatic Reliability.Isaac Davis - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):704-726.
    I propose a framework for pragmatic reliability in-the-limit criteria, extending the epistemic reliability framework. I identify some common scientific contexts that complicate the application or i...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Formal learning theory.Oliver Schulte - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Formal learning theory is the mathematical embodiment of a normative epistemology. It deals with the question of how an agent should use observations about her environment to arrive at correct and informative conclusions. Philosophers such as Putnam, Glymour and Kelly have developed learning theory as a normative framework for scientific reasoning and inductive inference.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Logic of belief revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Belief Revision Theory.Hanti Lin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 349-396.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations