It is a comment on Geppert about the concept of futility in cases of treatment-resistant anorexia nervosa.

'Brainjacking’ refers to the exercise of unauthorized control of another’s electronic brain implant. Whilst the possibility of hacking a Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) has already been proven in both experimental and real-life settings, there is reason to believe that it will soon be possible to interfere with the software settings of the Implanted Pulse Generators (IPGs) that play a central role in Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) systems. Whilst brainjacking raises ethical concerns pertaining to privacy and physical or psychological harm, we claim (...) that the possibility of brainjacking DBS raises particularly profound concerns about individual autonomy, since the possibility of hacking such devices raises the prospect of third parties exerting influence over the neural circuits underpinning the subject’s cognitive, emotional and motivational states. However, although it seems natural to assume that brainjacking represents a profound threat to individual autonomy, we suggest that the implications of brainjacking for individual autonomy are complicated by the fact that technologies targeted by brainjacking often serve to enhance certain aspects of the user’s autonomy. The difficulty of ascertaining the implications of brainjacking DBS for individual autonomy is exacerbated by the varied understandings of autonomy in the neuroethical and philosophical literature. In this paper, we seek to bring some conceptual clarity to this area by mapping out some of the prominent views concerning the different dimension of autonomous agency, and the implications of brainjacking DBS for each dimension. Drawing on three hypothetical case studies, we show that there could plausibly be some circumstances in which brainjacking could potentially be carried out in ways that could serve to enhance certain dimensions of the target’s autonomy. Our analysis raises further questions about the power, scope, and necessity of obtaining prior consent in seeking to protect patient autonomy when directly interfering with their neural states, in particular in the context of self-regulating closed-loop stimulation devices. (shrink)

Caring for patients with anorexia nervosa (AN) is associated with high levels of moral distress among healthcare professionals. The main moral conflict has been posited to be between applying coercion to prevent serious complications such as premature death and accepting treatment refusals. However, empirical evidence on this topic is scarce. We identified all 19 documentations of ethics consultations (ECs) in the context of AN from one clinical ethics support service in Switzerland. These documentations were coded with a sequential deductive-inductive approach (...) and the code system was interpreted in a case-based manner. Here, we present findings on patient characteristics and ethical concerns. The ECs typically concerned an intensely pretreated, extremely underweight AN patient endangering herself by refusing the proposed treatment. In addition to the justifiability of coercion, frequent ethical concerns were whether further coerced treatment aimed at weight gain would be ineffective or even harmful, evidencing uncertainty about beneficence and non-maleficence and a conflict between these principles. Discussed options included harm reduction (e.g. psychotherapy without weight gain requirements) and palliation (e.g. initiating end-of-life care), the appropriateness of which were ethical concerns in themselves. Overall, nine different types of conflicts between or uncertainties regarding ethical principles were identified with a median of eight per case. Ethical concerns in caring for persons with AN are diverse and complex. To deal with uncertainty about and conflict between respect for autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence, healthcare professionals consider non-curative approaches. However, currently, uncertainty around general justifiability, eligibility criteria, and concrete protocols hinders their adoption. (shrink)

BackgroundTraditionally, palliative care has focused on patients suffering from life-threatening somatic diseases such as cancer or progressive neurological disorders. In contrast, despite the often chronic, severely disabling, and potentially life-threatening nature of psychiatric disorders, there are neither palliative care units nor clinical guidelines on palliative measures for patients in psychiatry.Main textThis paper contributes to the growing literature on a palliative approach in psychiatry and is based on the assumption that a change of perspective from a curative to a palliative approach (...) could help promote patient-centeredness and increase quality of life for severely ill patients in psychiatry as well as in somatic medicine. To exemplify this, we offer three different clinical scenarios: severe and enduring anorexia nervosa, treatment-refractory schizophrenia, and chronic suicidality and persistent self-injury in borderline personality disorder.ConclusionWe emphasize that many typical interventions for treatment-refractory psychiatric disorders may indeed be of a palliative nature. Furthermore, introducing traditional features of palliative care, e.g. so-called goals of care conversations, could aid even further in ensuring that caregivers, patients, and families agree on which treatment goals are to be prioritized in order to optimize quality of life in spite of severe, persistent mental disorder. (shrink)

Since its introduction in the 1980s, futility as a concept has held contested meaning and applications throughout medicine. There has been little discussion within the psychiatric literature about the use of futility in the care of individuals experiencing severe and persistent mental illness (SPMI), despite some tacit acceptance that futility may apply in certain cases of psychiatric illness. In this paper, we explore the literature surrounding futility and argue that its connotation within medicine is to describe situations where patients (or (...) their substitute decision-makers) believe that interventions will almost certainly provide no meaningful benefit. We then provide two arguments in support of the use of futility within the care of individuals experiencing SPMI: that some SPMI can be considered a terminal illness, and that the risk-benefit ratio is a dynamic entity such that futility can help describe what Gillett calls the ‘risk of unacceptable badness’ when it comes to considering how an intervention might impact a patient’s quality of life. We posit that capacity should not pose an obstacle to declaring futility when caring for individuals experiencing SPMI and explain how futility is not antithetical to recovery in mental health. Finally, we describe how using futility within psychiatric practice can allow for a reorientation of care by signalling the need to shift to a palliative approach. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 8, August 2024, Page 90-93.

Bianchi, Stanley, and Sutander argue in an insightful, cogent manner for the consideration of harm reduction as an ethically-defensible, non-paternal management approach for capable persons...