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  1. Moral modesty, moral judgment and moral advice. A Wittgensteinian approach.Benjamin De Mesel - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 75 (1):20-37.
    Moral philosophy has traditionally aimed for correct or appropriate moral judgments. Consequently, when asked for moral advice, the moral philosopher first tries to develop a moral judgment and then informs the advisee. The focus is on what the advisee should do, not on whether any advice should be given. There may, however, be various kinds of reasons not to morally judge, to be ‘morally modest’. In the first part of this article, I give some reasons to be morally modest when (...)
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  • Do Moral Questions Ask for Answers?Benjamin De Mesel - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):43-61.
    It is often assumed that moral questions ask for answers in the way other questions do. In this article, moral and non-moral versions of the question ‘Should I do x or y?’ are compared. While non-moral questions of that form typically ask for answers of the form ‘You should do x/y’, so-called ‘narrow answers’, moral questions often do not ask for such narrow answers. Rather, they ask for answers recognizing their delicacy, the need for a deeper understanding of the meaning (...)
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  • José Medina: The Epistemology of Resistance: Oxford University Press, 368 pp, £22.99, 2013, ISBN: 978-0199929047.Jeremy C. Bradley - 2014 - Feminist Legal Studies 22 (3):311-317.
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  • Common morality and moral reform.K. A. Wallace - 2009 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (1):55-68.
    The idea of moral reform requires that morality be more than a description of what people do value, for there has to be some measure against which to assess progress. Otherwise, any change is not reform, but simply difference. Therefore, I discuss moral reform in relation to two prescriptive approaches to common morality, which I distinguish as the foundational and the pragmatic. A foundational approach to common morality (e.g., Bernard Gert’s) suggests that there is no reform of morality , but (...)
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