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  1. (1 other version)Dynamical systems theory in cognitive science and neuroscience.Luis H. Favela - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (8):e12695.
    Dynamical systems theory (DST) is a branch of mathematics that assesses abstract or physical systems that change over time. It has a quantitative part (mathematical equations) and a related qualitative part (plotting equations in a state space). Nonlinear dynamical systems theory applies the same tools in research involving phenomena such as chaos and hysteresis. These approaches have provided different ways of investigating and understanding cognitive systems in cognitive science and neuroscience. The ‘dynamical hypothesis’ claims that cognition is and can be (...)
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  • The Structure of Sensorimotor Explanation.Alfredo Vernazzani - 2018 - Synthese (11):4527-4553.
    The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same (...)
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  • A Cautionary Contribution to the Philosophy of Explanation in the Cognitive Neurosciences.A. Nicolás Venturelli - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (3):259-285.
    I propose a cautionary assessment of the recent debate concerning the impact of the dynamical approach on philosophical accounts of scientific explanation in the cognitive sciences and, particularly, the cognitive neurosciences. I criticize the dominant mechanistic philosophy of explanation, pointing out a number of its negative consequences: In particular, that it doesn’t do justice to the field’s diversity and stage of development, and that it fosters misguided interpretations of dynamical models’ contribution. In order to support these arguments, I analyze a (...)
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  • Rethinking the explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science.Dingmar van Eck - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1131-1161.
    ABSTRACTIn this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical (...)
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  • In Defense of Best-Explanation Debunking Arguments in Moral Philosophy.Jonathon Hricko & Derek Leben - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):143-160.
    We aim to develop a form of debunking argument according to which an agent’s belief is undermined if the reasons she gives in support of her belief are best explained as rationalizations. This approach is a more sophisticated form of what Shaun Nichols has called best-explanation debunking, which he contrasts with process debunking, i.e., debunking by means of showing that a belief has been generated by an epistemically defective process. In order to develop our approach, we identify an example of (...)
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  • Stuck in between. Phenomenology’s Explanatory Dilemma and its Role in Experimental Practice.Mark-Oliver Casper & Philipp Haueis - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (3):575-598.
    Questions about phenomenology’s role in non-philosophical disciplines gained renewed attention. While we claim that phenomenology makes indispensable, unique contributions to different domains of scientific practice such as concept formation, experimental design, and data collection, we also contend that when it comes to explanation, phenomenological approaches face a dilemma. Either phenomenological attempts to explain conscious phenomena do not satisfy a central constraint on explanations, i.e. the asymmetry between explanans and explanandum, or they satisfy this explanatory asymmetry only by largely merging with (...)
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  • Picking up the gauntlet. A reply to Casper and Haueis.Liliana Albertazzi - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-30.
    In recent years phenomenology has attracted the interest of science, acquiring a role far beyond philosophy. Despite Husserl's clear denial of a possible naturalization of phenomenology, scientists from different fields have proposed its naturalization. To achieve this goal, different methodologies have been proposed. Most scientists seem to agree on the claim that phenomenology cannot be a science itself because it fails to respect one of the prerequisites of science, that is, the capacity to explain its phenomena. Phenomenology, thus, is forced (...)
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