The paper takes a look at insurance customer dishonesty as a special case of consumer ethics, understood as a way of situation handling, as a moral choice between right and wrong, such as between self-interest vs. common-interest, in other words, a “moral temptation”. After briefly raising the question if different schools, of moral philosophy would conceptualize such moral temptations differently, the paper presents ‘moral psychology’ as a frame of reference, with a focus on cognitive moral development, moral attitude and moral (...) neutralization. Conceptualization questions can’t be answered finally without thinking at the same time of empirical research design and instrument design decisions, e.g. choosing between experiment vs. questionnaire studies, designing suitable moral temptation situations as an experiment vs. questionnaires with scenario vignettes. The paper discusses then experiences from a 2004 pilot survey, with a main focus on a few insurance dishonesty scenarios with follow-up questions. The paper has an open end, i.e. outlines desirable future theoretical, empirical and practical work with insurance customer dishonesty. (shrink)

In order for a moral theory to support application it must be able to provide determinate answers to actual moral problems or, at the least, to significantly narrow acceptable options. It must also support the development of a genuine consensus, one that is disinterested, reasonable, and unbiased. I argue that theories concentrating on principles, or on rules, or on particular cases fail to meet these standards. A full coherence theory, taking into account principles, rules, practices, and judgments holds the greatest (...) promise for successful application. I present a detailed outline of a full coherence theory that is principled, pluralistic, and comprehensive. This coherence theory includes three basic principles (expressed both negatively and positively), but binds these, in terms of their explication and application, to rules and practices. This theory respects current practices but also directs us to change practices and institutions and even the interpretation of basic moral principles. The theory includes ways to determine which aspect of moral experience should take precedence in given circumstances, ways to determine who has particular obligations, and how — by means of a mutuality principle — value may be enhanced under conditions of value conflict. (shrink)

Barger and Barney (2004/this issue) offered a number of reasons for the public, the news media, and journalism to develop special, mutually supportive standards of conduct. However, they imbedded these reasonable suggestions in an argument that claims far more than can be delivered. In explaining what is wrong with their argument, I place journalistic ethics within a general theory of professional ethics.