In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and, on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their original models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I then describe a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt’s models and fits more (...) adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more plausible than the original one. (shrink)

claim that his thought experiment shows that a currently living person is not a random sample is refuted. His thought experiment is reduced to a probability model, and is shown to be identical to one previously developed by Dieks. The status of the Doomsday Argument is left unresolved, since Dieks's refutation attempt is disputed in the literature.

Using the Autodialer thought experiment, we show that the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA) is too general, and propose a revision to the assumption that limits its applicability to causally-independent observers. Under the revised assumption, the Doomsday Argument fails, and the paradoxes associated with the standard SSA are dispelled. We also consider the effects of the revised sampling assumption on tests of cosmological theories. There we find that, while we must restrict our attention to universes containing at least one observer, the total (...) number of observers predicted in each universe is irrelevant to the confirmation of a theory. (shrink)

George Sowers tries to refute the Doomsday argument on grounds that true random sampling requires all possible samples to be equally probable the time when the sample is taken. Yet the Doomsday argument does not rely on true random sampling. It presupposes random sampling only in a metaphorical sense. After arguing that Sowers’ critique fails, I outline my own view on the matter, which is that the Doomsday argument is inconclusive and that by developing a theory of observation selection effects (...) one can show why that is so. (shrink)