In this paper, I discuss the use of after-effects as a criterion for showing that we can perceive high-level properties. According to this criterion, if a high-level property is susceptible to after-effects, this suggests that the property can be perceived, rather than cognized. The defenders of the criterion claim that, since after-effects are also present for low-level, uncontroversially perceptual properties, we can safely infer that high-level after-effects are perceptual as well. The critics of the criterion, on the other hand, assimilate (...) it to superficially similar effects in cognition and argue that the after-effect criterion is a cognitive phenomenon rather than a perceptual one, and that as a result it is not a reliable guide for exploring the contents of perception. I argue against both of these views and show that high-level after-effects cannot be identified either with low-level after-effects or with cognitive biases. I suggest an intermediate position: high-level after-effects are not cognitive, but they are nonetheless not a good criterion for exploring the contents of perception. (shrink)

According to John Haugeland, the capacity for “authentic intentionality” depends on a commitment to constitutive standards of objectivity. One of the consequences of Haugeland’s view is that a neurocomputational explanation cannot be adequate to understand “authentic intentionality”. This paper gives grounds to resist such a consequence. It provides the beginning of an account of authentic intentionality in terms of neurocomputational enabling conditions. It argues that the standards, which constitute the domain of objects that can be represented, reflect the statistical structure (...) of the environments where brain sensory systems evolved and develop. The objection that I equivocate on what Haugeland means by “commitment to standards” is rebutted by introducing the notion of “florid, self-conscious representing”. Were the hypothesis presented plausible, computational neuroscience would offer a promising framework for a better understanding of the conditions for meaningful representation. (shrink)

The on-going debate over the ‘admissible contents of perceptual experience’ concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that ‘ensemble properties’ should be added to the list of visually admissible properties. (...) Ensemble properties are features that belong to a set of perceptible objects as a whole as opposed to the individuals that constitute that set. They include such features as the mean size of an array of shapes or the average emotional expression of an array of faces. Recent work in vision science has yielded compelling evidence that the visual system routinely encodes such properties. We argue that epistemological considerations provide strong reasons to think that these properties figure in visual experience. Judgements about ensemble properties are immediately warranted by our perceptual experience, and the only plausible way that a perceptual experience could confer this warrant is if it confers awareness of ensemble properties. (shrink)

According to perceptual accounts of mindreading, we can see, rather than cognize, other people's mental states. On one version of this approach, certain mental properties figure in the contents of our perceptual experiences. In a recent paper, Varga has appealed to empirical research to argue that intentions and emotions can indeed be seen, rather than cognized. In this paper, I argue that none of the evidence adduced to support the perceptual account of mindreading shows that we see mental properties, as (...) opposed to non‐mental properties. (shrink)

Optical distortions as a visual disturbance are inherent in many optical devices such as spectacles or virtual reality headsets. In such devices, distortions vary spatially across the visual field. In progressive addition lenses, for example, the left and right regions of the lens skew the peripheral parts of the wearers visual field in opposing directions. The human visual system adapts to homogeneous distortions and the respective aftereffects are transferred to non-retinotopic locations. This study investigates simultaneous adaptation to two opposing distortions (...) at different retinotopic locations. Two oppositely skewed natural image sequences were presented to 10 subjects as adaptation stimuli at two distinct locations in the visual field. To do so, subjects were instructed to keep fixation on a target. Eye tracking was used for gaze control. Change of perceived motion direction was measured in a direction identification task. The point of subjective equality, that is, the angle at which a group of coherently moving dots was perceived as moving horizontal, was determined for both retinal locations. The shift of perceived motion direction was evaluated by comparing PSE before and after adaptation. A significant shift at both retinal locations in the direction of the skew distortion of the corresponding adaptation stimulus is demonstrated. Consequently, parallel adaptation to two opposing distortions in a retinotopic reference frame was confirmed by this study. (shrink)

The adaptation aftereffect plays a critical role in human development and survival. Existing studies have found that, compared with general individuals, individuals with learning disability, autism and dyslexia show a smaller amount of non-affective-based cognitive adaptation aftereffect. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether individuals with depression or depression tendency show similar phenomenon in the adaptation aftereffect, and whether such depression tendency occurs in the non-affective-based cognitive or emotional adaptation aftereffect. To address this question, the present study conducted two experiments. Experiments 1A (...) and 1B used the emotional facial expression adaptation paradigm to examine whether Chinese participants showed the emotional adaptation aftereffect and whether the emotional adaptation aftereffect was influenced by physical features of faces, respectively. Experiment 2 recruited two groups of participants, with high and low depression, respectively, to examine whether they showed differences in the emotional or cognitive adaptation aftereffect. Results showed that Chinese participants showed the typical emotional adaptation aftereffect, which was not influenced by physical features of faces. More importantly, compared to the low-depression group, the high-depression group showed a smaller emotional adaptation aftereffect, but the two groups showed a similar cognitive adaptation aftereffect. These results suggest that level of depressive symptoms is associated with the emotional adaptation aftereffect. (shrink)