Switch to: References

Citations of:

Ostrich tropes

Synthese 200 (1):1-25 (2022)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. There Are no Module or Modifier Tropes.Markku Keinänen - manuscript
    According to Robert K. Garcia, trope theories divide into two distinct groups based on the type of tropes (module or modifier) assumed. Although left unnoticed by many trope theorists, Garcia claims that the module/modifier distinction has important consequences regarding the ontological merits of the different trope theories. In this article, I argue that Garcia’s distinction between module and modifier tropes fails to provide any correct or informative classification of trope theories: Garcia’s distinction is based on assumptions and primitive notions trope (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Types of tropes : modifier and module.Robert K. Garcia - 2024 - In A. R. J. Fisher & Anna-Sofia Maurin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Properties. London: Routledge. pp. 229-38.
    The general concept of a trope – that of a non-shareable character-grounder – admits of a distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes. Roughly, a module trope is self-exemplifying whereas a modifier trope is not. This distinction has wide-ranging implications. Modifier tropes are uniquely eligible to be powers and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes are uniquely eligible to play a direct role in perception and causation. Moreover, each type of trope theory faces unique challenges concerning character- grounding. Modifier trope theory (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)Your red isn't my red! Connectionist Structuralism and the puzzle of abstract objects (draft).Chris Percy - manuscript
    This draft preprint presents a nine step argument for “Connectionist Structuralism” (CS), an account of the ontology of abstract objects that is neither purely nominalist nor purely platonist. CS is a common, often implicit assumption in parts of the artificial intelligence literature, but such discussions have not presented formal accounts of the position or engaged with metaphysical issues that potentially undermine it. By making the position legible and presenting an initial case for it, we hope to support a constructive dialogue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark