This essay aims to analyze the structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics Θ by explicating various senses of the term δύναµις at issue in the treatise. It is argued that Aristotle's central innovation, the sense of δύναµις most useful to his project in the treatise, is the kind of capacity characteristic of the pre-existent matter for substance. It is neither potentiality as a mode of being, as recent studies maintain, nor capacity for `complete' activity. It is argued further that, in starting with (...) the κύριος sense of δύναµις as capacity for change, Aristotle begins with the most familiar and acknowledged kind of capacity, in order to move to the less familiar but ultimately more useful notion of capacity for substance, and to bring these two kinds together through an analogical relation. (shrink)

Aristotle’s most fundamental distinction between changes and other activities is not that ofMetaphysicsΘ.6, between end-exclusive and end-inclusive activities, but one implicit inPhysics3.1’s definition of change, between the activity of something incomplete and the activity of something complete. Notably, only the latter distinction can account for Aristotle’s view, inPhysics3.3, that ‘agency’—effecting change in something, e.g. teaching—does not qualify strictly as a change. This distinction informsDe Anima2.5 and imparts unity to Aristotle’s extended treatment of change inPhysics3.1-3.

This dissertation explores Aristotle’s use of teleology as a principle of explanation, especially as it is used in the natural treatises. Its main purposes are, first, to determine the function, structure, and explanatory power of teleological explanations in four of Aristotle’s natural treatises, that is, in Physica (book II), De Anima, De Partibus Animalium (including the practice in books II-IV), and De Caelo (book II). Its second purpose is to confront these findings about Aristotle’s practice in the natural treatises with (...) the theoretical picture of the structure of teleological explanations gained from Aristotle’s theory of scientific demonstration. For this purpose a new interpretation of Analytica Posteriora II.11 is presented. This study thereby contributes to recent scholarship on the relation between Aristotle’s philosophy of science and his philosophy of nature, while at the same time adding to our knowledge of Aristotle’s notion of teleology in terms of its explanatory merits and limits. (shrink)

RésuméDans cet article, j’analyse quelques passages des Commentaires sur laPhysiquede Simplicius, Philopon et Thémistius afin de : 1) démontrer que ces commentateurs interprètent la phrase d’Aristote,Phys. III 1, 200b16-17, comme affirmant que « continu » est un terme définitoire du mouvement ; 2) identifier la raison pour laquelle ils pensent que parler du mouvement naturel revient à dire que le mouvement est continu, et que, par conséquent, quand Aristote évoque le continu dès le début de sa théorie sur le mouvement, (...) il ne fait qu’affirmer quelque chose d’évident ; 3) montrer que si l’analogie selon laquelle « continu » est un terme définitoire du mouvement, tout comme « mouvement » est un terme définitoire de la nature et « infini » un terme définitoire du continu, n’est pas parfaite (en effet « continu » n’apparaît pas explicitement dans la définition du mouvement), ceci est dû à l’impossibilité de subsumer le mouvement sous une catégorie de l’être. Pour appuyer ce dernier point, j’utilise une citation d’Alexandre par Simplicius, et un passage de Philopon. (shrink)