Research on ethical leadership generally falls into two categories: one celebrates individual leaders and their ‘authentic’ personalities and virtuous stewardship of organizations; the other decries toxic leaders or individuals in positions of power who exhibit ‘dark’ personality traits or dubious morals. Somewhere between these extremes, leadership is ‘done’ by imperfect human beings who try to avoid violating their own ethical standards while at the same time navigating the realities of social and organizational life. This paper discusses the concept of ‘Moral (...) Recovery’ as an ethical leadership process that begins in moral failure, but enables eventual personal, organizational, and social change. It builds on the concept of ‘Moral Injury’ from the work of the psychiatrist Johnathan Shay and refers to the experiences of armed service personnel traumatized by experiences where either they, or their leaders, violated their own values. ‘Morally injured’ parties recover their sense of wellbeing through engaging with restorative communal actions which address the social causes of unethical practices. The process of Moral Recovery requires restorative communal actions which address the social causes of unethical practices. This paper will outline the concept of ‘Moral Recovery’ as a form of practical ethical leadership and change. It will illustrate its relevance to ethical leadership practice with reference to one high-profile case; Ray Anderson of Interface. As this paper is primarily conceptual, avenues for future research are identified, and implications for teaching practice are discussed. (shrink)

An important aspect of human development in midlife is, according to E. Erikson’s theory, the successful resolution of the crisis between generativity and stagnation. Generativity is understood as focusing one’s energy on productivity and creativity - the creation of new works and ideas dedicated to future generations. It is assumed that generativity results from personal needs and constitutes a response to the social expectations directed at individuals. Concern for the next generation does not go hand-in-hand with concern for the personal (...) development of a person in midlife and this imbalance may lead to a psychological discomfort and a sense of martyrdom. Accordingly, it can therefore be concluded that a person focusing on the well-being of the social environment and neglecting her/himself is incapable of feeling that they are a subject that manages their fate and makes decisions enabling them to achieve personal psychological well-being. It could, therefore, be expected that the fulfilment of generative goals may lead to a reduction in the psychological well-being of a representative of middle adulthood. Empirical data has not confirmed this expectation. (shrink)

We argue that the problem of violence persists, to a certain degree, because of our refusal or inability to think about traumatic, difficult or “senseless” material systematically. We explore the connection between thinking and violence, and specifically Arendt’s question whether thinking can make men abstain from violence. We are interested in the relationship and tension between knowing and not knowing – as products of thinking – in relation to (also our own capacities for) violence. The tension presents in two main (...) ways. First, thinking is employed to shed light on dark or difficult knowable material, thereby increasing our understanding of ourselves, our place in a troubled society and our relation to violence. Second, thinking bumps up against our ability to know, and it is this unknowability that exposes us to our limits as thinking beings as well as a place of humility and mutual vulnerability. We suggest that paying closer and more nuanced attention to the gender dimensions of the above questions reveals something important about the reasons that gender-based violence persists. We argue, with Arendt, that violence results from non-mastery and that the equation of male power with violence is a lie that violence perpetuates about itself. Similarly, Heberle argues that violence results from the fragile non-cohesiveness of masculine subjectivity and thus also traces the roots of violence to weakness and fragility rather than strength or power. We argue that the antidote for this false mastery and control is thinking. (shrink)

Moral injury is a term whose popularity has grown in psychology and psychiatry, as well as philosophy, over the last several years. This presents challenges, because these fields use the term in different ways and draw their understanding from different sources, creating the potential for contradiction. This, however, is also an opportunity. Comparison between behavioral sciences and philosophy can help enrich understandings of harms considered not just psychological but moral. To this end, I provide an overview of the more influential (...) writing of moral injury, mapping them into three broad discourses: clinical, juridical-critical, and structural. This overview then leads to a discussion of how comparative engagement among these discourses promises to expand on current theories of moral harm. I argue that such a comparison will demonstrate that more emphasis on structural violence will strengthen current understandings of moral injury, often understood in a more narrow sense to be a result of more direct, physical violence, allowing us to view moral injury as a result of institutional and social violence and injustices. (shrink)

Reflecting teams play a significant role in family therapy; they broaden perspectives on how family dynamics or problems can be understood. However, what happens when a reflector does not feel compassionate towards a particular family member? There is a risk of biased reflections: families can pick up negative signals, putting the therapeutic relationship at risk. In this paper, I explore how I was supported to explore my lack of compassion for Dad ‘John’. It was only after reaching out to an (...) experienced supervisor who undertook an ‘internalised other’ interview with me – where I played the role of Dad – did my compassion increase. From an ethics of care perspective, I suggest that social professionals need to explore ways to increase empathy and compassion for clients they dislike. If they do not, they are open to valid criticism that they are behaving unethically as professionals. Therefore, there is a need to address deficits in empathy and compassion to sustain ethical social work practices. (shrink)

In this article, I undertake three main tasks. First, I argue that, contrary to the standard view, moral injury is not a species of PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) but rather, on the most coherent conception of moral injury, PTSD is (in effect) a species of moral injury. In doing so, I make use of the notion of caring deeply about something or someone worthy of being cared deeply about. Second, I consider so-called “dirty hands” actions in police work and in (...) war, and distinguish these from the morally legitimate, but harmful, actions of police officers and of war fighters, such as the morally legitimate use of coercive force and lethal force (respectively). While the morally legitimate use of harmful methods is constitutive of these occupational roles, “dirty hands” methods are not. Roughly speaking, a “dirty hands” action is one that is morally wrong and (typically) unlawful but done for the sake of a good outcome. Both categories of action are conducive to moral injury, but “dirty hands” actions much more so, especially given the slippery moral slope from “dirty hands” actions to egregious moral wrongdoing. Third, I offer some recommendations for reducing moral injury among police officers and war fighters. (shrink)

Amidst the return of military personnel from post-9/11 conflicts, a construct describing the readjustment challenges of some has received increasing attention: moral injury. This term has been variably defined with mental health professionals more recently conceiving of it as a transgression of moral beliefs and expectations that are witnessed, perpetrated, or allowed by the individual. To the extent that morality is a system of conceptualizing right and wrong, individuals’ moral systems are in large measure developmentally and socially derived and interpreted. (...) Thus, in seeking to provide care and aid in reintegration for combat veterans, it is necessary to consider communities that have contributed to an individual’s formation and that might have participated in the interpretation of his/her suffering. This can take many forms, but given that morality is often complexly intertwined with issues of religion, faith, and spirituality for many individuals, and recognizing that much of the current focus on moral injury is emanating out of healthcare contexts, we devote particular attention to how chaplains might be more intentionally engaged in healthcare systems such as the Veterans Health Administration to provide non-judgmental, person-centered, culturally-relevant care rooted in communities of practice to veterans with moral injury. (shrink)

Maternal health has become a top global priority. In contrast to the decline of the maternal subject (Stephens, 2011), and despite previous evidence that maternal health has struggled to find a place on the global policy agenda (Shiffman and Smith, 2007), it is now clear that the promotion of health for mothers and children is a staple of both government and private donor commitments. On humanitarian grounds, it makes sense to focus on maternal health and survival in the Global South. (...) Death related to pregnancy or childbirth is a disheartening example of needless suffering. But beyond the initial impulse to reduce suffering, what motivates and/or requires action for addressing injustice in the form of distributional inequities for maternal and reproductive health? In this article, I make a case for the necessity and validity of transnational cooperation to address maternal mortality and morbidity in the Global South. The first component of my argument addresses the transnational elements of both global interconnectedness and responsibility to act. These elements are drawn from Iris Marion Young’s philosophical justification for North-South responsibility-taking. The second component of my argument adds the concept of affective solidarity to that of transnational responsibility. My argument in this section draws from Iris Marion Young’s earlier work on identity (Young, 1990) and embodiment (Young, 1984) and expands the analysis of affective solidarity as a form of both embodiment and political commitment in order to explain the mechanism for transnational connection and understanding. And the final component of my argument explains how both of these elements – transnational responsibility and affective solidarity – support a theory of transnational maternal feminism. (shrink)

Xenotransplantation has great potential as an alternative to alleviate the shortage of organs for donation. However, given that the animal most suited for xenotransplantation is the pig, there are concerns that people in Muslim countries may be more hesitant to morally approve of these procedures. In this study, the moral approval of xenotransplantation was assessed in a group of 895 participants in Egypt. The results showed that religiosity itself does not predict moral approval of xenotransplantation, but religious identity does, as (...) Muslims are less likely to approve of xenotransplantation than Christians. However, the strongest predictor of moral approval of xenotransplantation was gender, with women displaying less approval. A partial mediating factor in this association was concern for animal welfare. Based on these results, some implications for public policy are discussed. (shrink)