Recently it has been argued that a model of directed perception provides an alternative to both indirect and direct accounts of the nature of vision. An examination of this proposal serves as a basis for challenging the meaningfulness and empirical import of the theoretical and ontological differences said to separate these models. Although focusing on James Cutting's work, the analysis is meant to speak more generally to the supposed significance of the distinctions among indirect, direct, and directed theories of perception.

We use our knowledge of causal relationships to imagine possible events. We also use these relationships to look deep into the past and infer events that were not witnessed or to infer what can not be directly seen in the present. Knowledge of causal relationships allows us to go beyond the here and now. This chapter introduces a new theoretical framework for how this very basic concept might be mentally represented. It proposes an epistemological theory of causation — that is, (...) a theory that specifies the nature of people's knowledge of causation, the notion of causation used in everyday language and reasoning. (shrink)