At the turn of the twentieth century, biologists such as Oscar Riddle, Thomas Hunt Morgan, Frank Lillie, and Richard Goldschmidt all puzzled over the question of sexual difference, the distinction between male and female. They all offered competing explanations for the biological cause of this difference, and engaged in a fierce debate over the primacy of their respective theories. Riddle propounded a metabolic theory of sex dating from the late-nineteenth century suggesting that metabolism lay at the heart of sexual difference. (...) Thomas Hunt Morgan insisted on the priority of chromosomes, Frank Lillie emphasized the importance of hormones, while Richard Goldschmidt supported a mixed model involving both chromosomes and hormones. In this paper, I will illustrate how the older metabolic theory of sex was displaced when those who argued for the relatively newer theories of chromosomes and hormones gradually formed an alliance that accommodated each other and excluded the metabolic theory of sex. By doing so, proponents of chromosomes and hormones established their authority over the question of sexual difference as they laid the foundations for the new disciplines of genetics and endocrinology. Their debate raised urgent questions about what constituted sexual difference, and how scientists envisioned the plasticity and controllability of this difference. These theories also had immediate political and cultural consequences at the turn of the twentieth century, especially for the eugenic and feminist movements, both of which were heavily invested in knowledge of sex and its determination, ascertainment, and command. (shrink)

T. H. Morgan (1866–1945), the founder of the Drosophila research group in genetics that established the chromosome theory of Mendelian inheritance, has been described as a radical empiricist in the historical literature. His empiricism, furthermore, is supposed to have prejudiced him against certain scientific conclusions. This paper aims to show two things: first, that the sense in which the term empiricism has been used by scholars is too weak to be illuminating. It is necessary to distinguish between empiricism as an (...) epistemological position and the so-called methodological empiricism. I will argue that the way the latter has been presented cannot distinguish an empiricist methodology from a non-empiricist one. Second, I will show that T. H. Morgan was not an epistemological empiricist as this term is usually defined in philosophy. The reason is that he believed in the existence of genes as material entities when they were unobservable entities when they were unobservable entities introduced to account for the phenotypic ratios found in breeding experiments. These two points, of course, are interrelated. If we were to water down the meaning of empiricis, perhaps we could call Morgan an empiricist. But then we would also fail to distinguish empiricism from realism. (shrink)

From the 1930s through the 1970s, C. H. Waddington attempted to reunite genetics, embryology, and evolution. One of the means to effect this synthesis was his model of the epigenetic landscape. This image originally recast genetic data in terms of embryological diagrams and was used to show the identity of genes and inducers and to suggest the similarities between embryological and genetic approaches to development. Later, the image became more complex and integrated gene activity and mutations. These revised epigenetic landscapes (...) presented an image of how mutations could alter developmental pathways to yield larger phenotypic changes. These diagrams became less important as the operon became used to model differential gene regulation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A rereading of the American scientific literature on sex determination from 1902 to 1926 leads to a different understanding of the construction of the Mendelian‐chromosome theory after 1910. There was significant intellectual continuity, which has not been properly appreciated, underlying this scientific “revolution.” After reexamining the relationship between the ideas of key scientists, in particular Edmund B. Wilson and Thomas Hunt Morgan, I argue that, contrary to the historical literature, Wilson and Morgan did not adopt opposing views on Mendelism (...) and sex determination. Rather, each preferred a non‐Mendelian explanation of the determination of sex. Around 1910, both integrated the Mendelian and non‐Mendelian theories to create a synthetic theory. One problem was the need to avoid an overly deterministic view of sex while also accepting the validity of Mendelism. Morgan’s discovery of mutations on the X chromosome takes on different significance when set in the context of the debate about sex determination, and Calvin Bridges’s work on sex determination is better seen as a development of Morgan’s ideas, rather than a departure from them. Conclusions point to the role of synthesis within fields as a way to advance scientific theories and reflect on the relationship between synthesis and explanatory “pluralism” in biology. (shrink)

American biologists in the late nineteenth century pioneered the descriptive-comparative study of all cell divisions from zygote to gastrulation -- the cell lineage. Data from cell lineages were crucial to evolutionary and developmental questions of the day. One of the main questions was the ultimate causation of developmental patterns -- historical or mechanical. E. B. Wilson's groundbreaking lineage work on the polychaete worm Nereis in 1892 set the stage for (1) an attack on Haeckel's phylogenetic-historical notion of recapitulation and (2) (...) support for mechanistic explanations of cleavage patterns. As more lineage work -- especially Lillie's work on "Unio" and Conklin's on "Crepidula" -- became available in the mid-late 1890s, mechanism was tempered with more evolutionary, homology-based views. However, as I show by focusing on three major issues -- homology, body plans and life history -- these views were primarily based on the precocious segregation and prospective significance -- what the cell became not what it was. Even on issues like adaptation, most lineagists argued teleologically from the adult backward. Most cell lineage workers, by 1900, were to varying degrees mechanist/experimentalist and recapitulationist simultaneously. The exception was E. G. Conklin, whose views were more akin to a Darwinian evolutionist than either mechanist or recapitulationist. Lineage work eventually declined and by 1907 published accounts of new lineages had basically stopped. I argue that established workers and younger researchers stopped wanting to take on cell lineage projects because the general patterns were the same for all the spiralians while the specifics showed too much variation. It was hard to theoretically encompass or analyze the minutiae of variation in a recapitulationist or mechanist framework. The only established worker who continued to do comparative lineage studies was E. G. Conklin, perhaps because the variation could best be accommodated by Darwinian evolution. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the early theory building process of Thomas Hunt Morgan from the 1910s to the 1930s and the introduction of the invisible gene as a main explanatory unit of heredity. Morgan’s work marks the transition between two different styles of thought. In the early 1900s, he shifted from an embryological study of the development of the organism to a study of the mechanism of genetic inheritance and gene action. According to his contemporaries as well as to historiography, Morgan (...) separated genetics from embryology, and the gene from the whole organism. Other scholars identified an underlying embryological focus in Morgan’s work throughout his career. Our paper aims to clarify the debate by concentrating on Morgan’s theory building—characterized by his confidence in the power of experimental methods, and carefully avoiding any ontological commitment towards the gene—and on the continuity of the questions to be addressed by both embryology and genetics. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, Tatsuo Aida in Japan, Øjvind Winge in Denmark, Richard Goldschmidt in Germany, and Calvin Bridges in the United States all developed different experimental systems to study the genetics of sex reversal. These locally specific experimental systems grounded these experimenters’ understanding of sex reversal as well as their interpretation of claims regarding experimental results and theories. The comparison of four researchers and their experimental systems reveals how those different systems mediated their understanding of genetic phenomena, and (...) influenced their interpretations of sex reversal. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the structural development of institution-based interest in genetics in Anglo-North American medicine after 1930 concomitantly with an analysis of the changes through which ideas about heredity and the hereditary transmission of diseases in families have passed. It maintains that the unfolding relationship between medicine and genetics can best be understood against the background of the shift in emphasis in conceptualisations of recurring patterns of disease in families from ‘biological relatedness’ to ‘related to chromosomes and genes’. The (...) paper begins with brief considerations of the historical confluences of, first, heredity and medicine and, second, genetics and medicine which, in a third section, leads to a discussion about a uniquely ‘genetics-based approach’ to medicine in the second half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

T. H. Morgan, A. H. Sturtevant, H. J. Muller and C. B. Bridges published their comprehensive treatise "The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity" in 1915. By 1920 Morgan 's "Chromosome Theory of Heredity" was generally accepted by geneticists in the United States, and by British geneticists by 1925. By 1930 it had been incorporated into most general biology, botany, and zoology textbooks as established knowledge. In this paper, I examine the reasons why it was accepted as part of a series of (...) comparative studies of theory-acceptance in the sciences. In this context it is of interest to look at the persuasiveness of confirmed novel predictions, a factor often regarded by philosophers of science as the most important way to justify a theory. Here it turns out to play a role in the decision of some geneticists to accept the theory, but is generally less important than the CTH's ability to explain Mendelian inheritance, sex-linked inheritance, non-disjunction, and the connection between linkage groups and the number of chromosome pairs; in other words, to establish a firm connection between genetics and cytology. It is remarkable that geneticists were willing to accept the CTH as applicable to all organisms at a time when it had been confirmed only for Drosophila. The construction of maps showing the location on the chromosomes of genes for specific characters was especially convincing for non-geneticists. (shrink)

Evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) offers both an account of developmental processes and also new integrative frameworks for analyzing interactions between development and evolution. Biologists and philosophers are keen on evo-devo in part because it appears to offer a comfort zone between, on the one hand, what some take to be the relative inability of mainstream evolutionary biology to integrate a developmental perspective; and, on the other hand, what some take to be more intractable syntheses of development and evolution. In this (...) article, I outline core concerns of evo-devo, distinguish theoretical and practical variants, and counter Sterelny's recent argument that evo-devo's attention to development, while important, offers no significant challenge to evolutionary theory as we know it. (shrink)

The present account aims to contribute to a better characterization of the state and the dynamics of embryological knowledge at the dawn of the molecular revolution in biology. In this study, Albert Dalcq (1893-1973) was chosen as a representative of a generation of embryologists who found themselves at the junction of two very different approaches to the study of life: the first, focusing on global properties of organisms; the second focusing on the characterization of basic molecular constituents. Though clearly belonging (...) to the organismic tradition, Dalcq was already blending his experimental and explanatory practices with biochemical aspects by the 1930s. Principally based on published sources, the present analysis focuses on the conceptual definitions, modifications and interrelations on which Dalcq's explanation of development rested. Among these are variant process concepts such as gradients and fields, which are often thought to have strongly holistic implications. I will argue that Dalcq's version of these concepts was compatible with a more reductionist treatment of embryos than was accepted by most embryologists as late as the 1950s, pointing to some extent toward the recent molecular characterization of gradients by molecular geneticists such as Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard. Moreover, I will show how the embryological research program of Dalcq and his pupil Jean Brachet has been largely instrumental in the development of molecular biology in Belgium. (shrink)

This paper describes the historical background and early formation of Wilhelm Johannsen's distinction between genotype and phenotype. It is argued that contrary to a widely accepted interpretation his concepts referred primarily to properties of individual organisms and not to statistical averages. Johannsen's concept of genotype was derived from the idea of species in the tradition of biological systematics from Linnaeus to de Vries: An individual belonged to a group - species, subspecies, elementary species - by representing a certain underlying type. (...) Johannsen sharpened this idea theoretically in the light of recent biological discoveries, not least those of cytology. He tested and confirmed it experimentally combining the methods of biometry, as developed by Francis Galton, with the individual selection method and pedigree analysis, as developed for instance by Louis Vilmorin. The term "genotype" was introduced in W. Johannsen's 1909 treatise, but the idea of a stable underlying biological "type" distinct from observable properties was the core idea of his classical bean selection experiment published 6 years earlier. The individual ontological foundation of population analysis was a self-evident presupposition in Johannsen's studies of heredity in populations from their start in the early 1890s till his death in 1927. The claim that there was a "substantial but cautious modification of Johannsen's phenotype-genotype distinction" from a statistical to an individual ontological perspective derives from a misreading of the 1903 and 1909 texts. The immediate purpose of this paper is to correct this reading of the 1903 monograph by showing how its problems and results grow out of Johannsen's earlier work in heredity and plant breeding. Johannsen presented his famous selection experiment as the culmination of a line of criticism of orthodox Darwinism by William Bateson, Hugo de Vries, and others. They had argued that evolution is based on stepwise rather than continuous change in heredity. Johannsen's paradigmatic experiment showed how stepwise variation in heredity could be operationally distinguished from the observable, continuous morphological variation. To test Galton's law of partial regression, Johannsen deliberately chose pure lines of self-fertilizing plants, a pure line being the descendants in successive generations of one single individual. Such a population could be assumed to be highly homogeneous with respect to hereditary type, and Johannsen found that selection produced no change in this type. Galton, he explained, had experimented with populations composed of a number of stable hereditary types. The partial regression which Galton found was simply an effect of selection between types, increasing the proportion of some types at the expense of others. (shrink)

Despite the controversial nature of studies of reproductive phenomena, a major center of reproductive biology emerged and coalesced in the Department of Zoology at the University of Chicago circa 1892–1940. Led by Frank R. Lillie, several small groups of researchers pioneered the study of sex determination and sex hormones, pursuing these via a Chicago approach to framing biological practice at both cellular and organismic levels. They worked in an interdisciplinary manner, however much in tandem, and drew strongly on local resources—from (...) the stockyards to local philanthropy. Most remarkably, Lillie redirected the mission of the major National Research Council Committee for Research Problems of Sex to address the biology of sex and then garnered about a fifth of its funds for Chicago. He thus guided Chicago biology into the fully modern era of external support for on-campus research and elaborate national scientific networks via promising biological solutions to social problems. (shrink)

Bernard Norton's friends in the history of science have had many reasons for commemorating, with admiration and affection, not only his research and teaching but no less his conversation and his company. One of his most estimable traits was his refusal to beat about the bush in raising the questions he thought worthwhile pursuing. I still remember discoursing at Pittsburgh on Darwin's route to his theory of natural selection, and being asked at the end by Bernard what were Darwin's views (...) on heredity. I answered with the conventional waffle to the effect that the theory concerned the populational fate rather than the individual production and transmission of heritable variation, so that whatever views Darwin had on heredity had only a subsidiary place in his theorizing. Bernard was not fooled. ‘I would have thought’, he said, ‘that in order to understand anyone's theorising about evolution it would be necessary to look at his views on heredity’. (shrink)

Early in his career Thomas Hunt Morgan was interested in embryology and dedicated his research to studying organisms that could regenerate. Widely regarded as a regeneration expert, Morgan was invited to deliver a series of lectures on the topic that he developed into a book, Regeneration. In addition to presenting experimental work that he had conducted and supervised, Morgan also synthesized and critiqued a great deal of work by his peers and predecessors. This essay probes into the history of regeneration (...) studies by looking in depth at Regeneration and evaluating Morgan’s contribution. Although famous for his work with fruit fly genetics, studying Regeneration illuminates Morgan’s earlier scientific approach which emphasized the importance of studying a diversity of organisms. Surveying a broad range of regenerative phenomena allowed Morgan to institute a standard scientific terminology that continues to inform regeneration studies today. Most importantly, Morgan argued that regeneration was a fundamental aspect of the growth process and therefore should be accounted for within developmental theory. Establishing important similarities between regeneration and development allowed Morgan to make the case that regeneration could act as a model of development. The nature of the relationship between embryogenesis and regeneration remains an active area of research. (shrink)

The discursive explosion that was provoked by the new genetics could support the impression that the ethical and social problems posed by the new genetics are somehow exceptional in their very nature. According to this view we are faced with special ethical and social problems that create a challenge so fundamental that the special label of genethics is needless to justify. The historical account regarding the evolution of the gene concepts could serve us to highlight the limits of what we (...) know about genes and what we can do with genes. The widespread notion about the exceptionality of genetic knowledge and its applicative possibilities is hardly justifiable and leads to misunderstandings regarding the conceptualization of the ethical and social problems we might face. Following a more realistic interpretation of the role of genes in human life we might avoid a whole set of fictive dilemmas and counterproductive regulatory efforts in bioethics. Bioethical discourse should move from the gene-centered scientific discourse toward the more sophisticated and complex discourses where human development represented as a matter of complex interactions between genomes and environments, between genes, educational factors, nutritional regimes, and other different developmental resources. If a gene is seen as one among the different developmental resources that are shaping a given human trait then both genethics and genetic exceptionalism could hardly be represented as a justified approach in discussing the ethical and social problems of genetics. (shrink)

Der Artikel führt den Begriff der epistemischen Konkurrenz ein. Im Gegensatz zu „wissenschaftliche Kontroverse“ beschreibt er eine Situation, in der sich zwei Forschungsfelder gegenseitig als mit demselben Bereich von Phänomen befasst wahrnehmen, wobei ihre methodischen Ansätze und theoretischen Erklärungen jedoch so unterschiedlich sind, dass ein offener Konflikt über die Wahrheit oder Falschheit bestimmter Aussagen oder die Genauigkeit in der Anwendung einer Methode nicht stattfindet. Nichtsdestotrotz streben beide Parteien danach, die maßgebliche Erklärung der entsprechenden Phänomene anzubieten. Indem die erweiterte Gemeinschaft der (...) Forschenden oder die Öffentlichkeit einen Ansatz als maßgeblich anerkennt, handeln sie als eine dritte, gewissermaßen neutrale Partei, die einen Preis vergibt, um den die anderen Parteien konkurrieren. Der Artikel beschreibt das Verhältnis von Genetik und Entwicklungsbiologie um 1900 als epistemische Konkurrenz. Diese Forschungsfelder geben unterschiedliche Erklärungen für die Phänomene der organischen Reproduktion. Die Erklärungen unterscheiden sich bezüglich der Formbegriffe und entsprechend hinsichtlich der Begriffe der Vererbung von Aspekten der Form eines Organismus. Zudem basieren die Erklärungen der beiden Felder auf unterschiedlichen Arten kausalen Schließens, die in unterschiedliche experimentelle Ansätze eingebettet sind. Diese Unterschiede können als Instanzen eines allgemeineren Unterschieds zwischen der Tradition der Naturgeschichte, die sich mit Unterschieden zwischen Organismen auseinandersetzt, und der Tradition der Anatomie, die sich mit den Teilen der Organismen beschäftigt, angesehen werden. Dieses Bild der Genetik und Entwicklungsbiologie als Zweige unterschiedlicher fest verankerter Traditionen widerspricht dem Narrativ der Trennung des Begriffs der Vererbung von dem der Entwicklung im Zuge einer Trennung der Disziplinen der Genetik und der Embryologie, das in der Historiographie der Biologie nach wie vor weit verbreitet ist. (shrink)

This article describes how empirical discoveries in the 1930s–1950s regarding population variation for chromosomal inversions affected Theodosius Dobzhansky and Richard Goldschmidt. A significant fraction of the empirical work I discuss was done by Dobzhansky and his coworkers; Goldschmidt was an astute interpreter, with strong and unusual commitments. I argue that both belong to a mechanistic tradition in genetics, concerned with the effects of chromosomal organization and systems on the inheritance patterns of species. Their different trajectories illustrate how scientists’ commitments affect (...) how they interpret new evidence and adjust to it. Dobzhansky was moved to revised views about selection, while Goldschmidt moved his attention to different genetic phenomena. However different, there are significant connections between the two that enrich our understanding of their views. I focus on two: the role of developmental considerations in Dobzhansky’s thought and the role of neutrality and drift in Goldschmidt’s evolutionary account. Dobzhansky’s struggle with chromosomal variation is not solely about competing schools of thought within the selectionist camp, as insightfully articulated by John Beatty, but also a story of competition between selectionist thinking and developmental perspectives. In contraposition, Goldschmidt emphasized the role of low penetrance mutations that spread neutrally and pointed out that drift could result from developmental canalization. This account adds to the dominant story about Goldschmidt’s resistance to the splitting of development from genetics, as told by Garland Allen and Michael Dietrich. The story I tell illustrates how developmental thinking and genetic thinking conflicted and influenced researchers with different convictions about the significance of chromosomal organization. (shrink)

Throughout the 1930s two of Germany’s most senior geneticists were caught up in controversy as they tried to enter the distinctly American culture of Drosophila genetics. When Richard Goldschmidt and Victor Jollos were forced by the Nazis to leave Germany in 1936 and 1933, respectively, this type of conflict intensified. The experiences of Goldschmidt and Jollos as émigré scientists are interpreted in terms of a conflict of scientific styles of thought. Their Americanization, I claim, involved the modification of their scientific (...) styles and consequently the ways in which they conceived of and presented their scientific work. (shrink)

Embryonic development and ontogeny occupy whatis often depicted as the black box betweengenes – the genotype – and the features(structures, functions, behaviors) of organisms– the phenotype; the phenotype is not merelya one-to-one readout of the genotype. Thegenes home, context, and locus of operation isthe cell. Initially, in ontogeny, that cell isthe single-celled zygote. As developmentensues, multicellular assemblages of like cells(modules) progressively organized as germlayers, embryonic fields, anlage,condensations, or blastemata, enable genes toplay their roles in development and evolution.As modules, condensations are (...) fundamentaldevelopmental and selectable units ofmorphology (morphogenetic units) that mediateinteractions between genotype and phenotype viaevolutionary developmental mechanisms. In ahierarchy of emergent processes, gene networksand gene cascades (genetic modules) link thegenotype with morphogenetic units such ascondensations, while epigenetic processes suchas embryonic inductions, tissue interactionsand functional integration, link morphogeneticunits to the phenotype. To support theseconclusions I distinguish units of heredityfrom units of transmission and discussepigenetic inheritance by tracing the historyof relationship between embryology andevolution, especially the role(s) assigned tocells or to cellular components in generatingtheories of morphological change in evolution.The concept of cells as modular morphogeneticunits is modeled and illustrated using themammalian dentary bone. (shrink)

Well into the 1940s, many French biologists rejected both Mendelian genetics and Darwinism in favour of neo-transformism, the claim that evolution proceeds by the inheritance of acquired characteristics. In 1931 the zoologist Maurice Caullery published Le Problème d’évolution, arguing that, while Lamarckian mechanisms could not be demonstrated in the present, they had nevertheless operated in the past. It was in this context that Raymond Aron expressed anxiety about the relationship between biology, history, and human autonomy in his 1938 Introduction à (...) la philosophie de l’histoire: essai sur les limites de l’objectivité historique, in which he rejected both neo-Kantian and biological accounts of human history. Aron aspired to a philosophy of history that could explain the dual nature of human existence as fundamentally rooted in the biological, and at the same time, as a radical transcendence of natural law. I argue that Aron’s encounter with evolutionary theory at this moment of epistemic crisis in evolutionary theory was crucial to the formation of his philosophy of history, and moreover that this case study demonstrates the importance of moving beyond the methodological divisions between intellectual history and history of science. (shrink)

Filósofos e historiadores da ciência oferecem explicações para cientistas aceitarem ou rejeitaremuma dada hipótese ou teoria, mas, de um modo geral, não apresentam critérios que permitamdeterminar de maneira clara o que seja aceitação e o que seja rejeição. Com o intuitode contribuir para elucidar este problema, foi proposto um método de análise em Martinse Martins, exemplificado pelo posicionamento do naturalista inglês William Bateson diante da teoria cromossômica, no período compreendido entre 1902 e 1926.O objetivo deste artigo é aplicar o método (...) de análise acima mencionado para esclarecer aposição adotada pelo zoólogo Thomas Hunt Morgan diante da hipótese/teoriacromossômica, no período compreendido entre 1903 e 1910-1911. Nossa análise mostraque Morgan rejeitou a teoria cromossômica no período considerado e que sua mudançarepentina de opinião se deveu a uma estratégia profissional. (shrink)

Cytogenetics was born of the confluence of two so-far independent fields: cytological studies and breeding studies, which merged through the identification of genes with chromosomes. In this paper I argue that genes were introduced as functional entities. Functional explanations are presented here as a subclass of inferences to the best explanation and I argue that abductive arguments do not offer conclusive proof for the existence of the entities postulated through them. However, functional explanations usually follow a scheme laid out by (...) Fodor (1968): there is a first phase where hypothetical entities are postulated and individuated through their effects; there is a second phase where the physical structures responsible for these effects are sought. I analyze the development of both phases in the construction of the chromosome theory of Mendelian inheritance. I will argue that first-phase theories are important to set conditions of identification for the functions played by a certain structure in a given containing system. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Artikel führt den Begriff der epistemischen Konkurrenz ein. Im Gegensatz zu „wissenschaftliche Kontroverse“ beschreibt er eine Situation, in der sich zwei Forschungsfelder gegenseitig als mit demselben Bereich von Phänomen befasst wahrnehmen, wobei ihre methodischen Ansätze und theoretischen Erklärungen jedoch so unterschiedlich sind, dass ein offener Konflikt über die Wahrheit oder Falschheit bestimmter Aussagen oder die Genauigkeit in der Anwendung einer Methode nicht stattfindet. Nichtsdestotrotz streben beide Parteien danach, die maßgebliche Erklärung der entsprechenden Phänomene anzubieten. Indem die erweiterte Gemeinschaft der (...) Forschenden oder die Öffentlichkeit einen Ansatz als maßgeblich anerkennt, handeln sie als eine dritte, gewissermaßen neutrale Partei, die einen Preis vergibt, um den die anderen Parteien konkurrieren. Der Artikel beschreibt das Verhältnis von Genetik und Entwicklungsbiologie um 1900 als epistemische Konkurrenz. Diese Forschungsfelder geben unterschiedliche Erklärungen für die Phänomene der organischen Reproduktion. Die Erklärungen unterscheiden sich bezüglich der Formbegriffe und entsprechend hinsichtlich der Begriffe der Vererbung von Aspekten der Form eines Organismus. Zudem basieren die Erklärungen der beiden Felder auf unterschiedlichen Arten kausalen Schließens, die in unterschiedliche experimentelle Ansätze eingebettet sind. Diese Unterschiede können als Instanzen eines allgemeineren Unterschieds zwischen der Tradition der Naturgeschichte, die sich mit Unterschieden zwischen Organismen auseinandersetzt, und der Tradition der Anatomie, die sich mit den Teilen der Organismen beschäftigt, angesehen werden. Dieses Bild der Genetik und Entwicklungsbiologie als Zweige unterschiedlicher fest verankerter Traditionen widerspricht dem Narrativ der Trennung des Begriffs der Vererbung von dem der Entwicklung im Zuge einer Trennung der Disziplinen der Genetik und der Embryologie, das in der Historiographie der Biologie nach wie vor weit verbreitet ist. (shrink)