Providers are essential to the delivery of abortion care. Yet, they often occupy an ambiguous space in political discourse around abortion. The introduction of a new abortion service in Ireland invites us to look afresh at providers. Since the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 came into force, by far the most common form of abortion care has been early medical abortion (EMA). This is typically provided by General Practitioners (GPs), with approximately 10% of GPs having chosen to (...) provide EMA. This article draws on an empirical study of providers to investigate their motivations for, and experiences of, provision and their views on colleagues who have not chosen to provide. The study shows that for many providers, the choice to provide was grounded in a moral commitment to protecting women’s rights to autonomy and health and ensuring that the harms of the past were not repeated. The article argues that notwithstanding increased normalisation of EMA in Ireland, conscience still has a role to play in abortion care provision and it is important to reflect on the various aspects of this role. (shrink)

Giubiliniet aloffer some helpful reflections on the conscientious provision of medical care and whether and in what circumstances professional associations ought to support the conscientious provision of abortion in circumstances where abortion is banned or heavily restricted. I have several reservations, however, about the argument developed in the article. First, the essay makes questionable use of the case of Savita Halappanavar to justify its central argument about conscientious provision. Second, there is an apparent inconsistency between this article and the authors’ (...) statements elsewhere about the conscientious refusal of care. Third, there are risks that attend to professional associations supporting practitioners who break the law, and yet Giubiliniet aldo not give sufficient attention to this. This response will briefly discuss these three concerns. (shrink)

Abstract“Conscientious provision” refers to situations in which clinicians wish to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments prohibited within their (usually Catholic) health care institutions. It mirrors “conscientious objection,” which refers to situations in which clinicians refuse to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments offered within their (usually secular) health care institutions. Conscientious provision is not protected by law, but conscientious objection is. In practice, this asymmetry privileges conservative religious or moral values (usually associated with objection) over secular moral values (usually (...) associated with provision). In this article, we first argue for a legal right to one kind of conscientious provision: referral for procedures prohibited at Catholic hospitals. We then argue that a premise in that argument—the principle of comparably trivial institutional burdens—justifies legal protections for some additional forms of conscientious provision that include, for example, writing prescriptions for contraception or medical abortions. However, this principle cannot justify legal protections for other forms of conscientious provision, for instance, the right to perform surgical abortions or gender-affirming hysterectomies at Catholic hospitals. (shrink)