Switch to: References

Citations of:

Moral Learning, Rationality, and the Unreliability of Affect

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):460-473 (2018)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Against moral judgment. The empirical case for moral abolitionism.Hanno Sauer - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):137-154.details In this paper, I argue that recent evidence regarding the psychological basis of moral cognition supports a form of (moderate) moral abolitionism. I identify three main problems undermining the epistemic quality of our moral judgments – contamination, reliability, and bad incentives – and reject three possible responses: neither moral expertise, nor moral learning, nor the possibility of moral progress succeed in solving the aforementioned epistemic problems. The result is a moderate form of moral abolitionism, according to which we should make (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Implicit Cognition, Dual Process Theory, and Moral Judgment.Charlie Blunden, Paul Rehren & Hanno Sauer - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 105-114.details Implicit cognition is cognition that happens automatically and (typically) non-consciously. In moral psychology, implicit cognition is almost always understood in terms of dual process models of moral judgment. In this chapter, we address the question whether implicit moral judgment is usefully cashed out in terms of automatic (“type 1”) processes, and what the limitations of this approach are. Our chapter has six sections. In (1), we provide a brief overview of dual process models of domain-general (moral and non-moral) cognition. (2) (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The mark of the moral: Beyond the sentimentalist turn.Frank Hindriks & Hanno Sauer - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):569-591.details In light of recent empirical data, many psychologists and philosophers have turned away from rationalism about moral judgment and embraced sentimentalism. In the process, they have rejected the classical “moral signature” as a way of distinguishing moral from conventional norms in favor of a sentimentalist approach to carving out the moral domain. In this paper, we argue that this sentimentalist turn has been made prematurely. Although we agree that the experiments reveal that the classical approach is flawed, we propose to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations

1