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  1. End-Of-Life Decisions in Chronic Disorders of Consciousness: Sacrality and Dignity as Factors.Rocco Salvatore Calabrò, Antonino Naro, Rosaria De Luca, Margherita Russo, Lory Caccamo, Alfredo Manuli, Bernardo Alagna, Angelo Aliquò & Placido Bramanti - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):85-102.
    The management of patients suffering from chronic disorders of consciousness inevitably raises important ethical questions about the end of life decisions. Some ethical positions claim respect of human life sacredness and the use of good medical practices require allowing DOC patients to live as long as possible, since no one can arbitrarily end either his/her or others’ life. On the other hand, some currents of thought claim respect of human life dignity, patients’ wishes, and the right of free choice entail (...)
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  • Withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from minimally conscious and vegetative patients: family perspectives.Celia Kitzinger & Jenny Kitzinger - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (2):157-160.
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  • Perception of Value and the Minimally Conscious State.Stephen Napier - 2015 - HEC Forum 27 (3):265-286.
    The “disability paradox” is the idea that for those who become severely disabled, their own quality of life assessment remains at or slightly below the QoL assessments of normal controls. This is a source of skepticism regarding third-person QoL judgments of the disabled. I argue here that this skepticism applies as well to those who are in the minimally conscious state. For rather simple means of sustaining an MCS patient’s life, the cost of being wrong that the patient would not (...)
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  • Deep brain stimulation for prolonged disorders of consciousness.Gilberto K. K. Leung - 2016 - Clinical Ethics 11 (4):105-111.
    Deep brain stimulation has emerged as a “last resort” therapy for patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness. The latter encompasses a range of conditions including minimal conscious state and persistent vegetative state. Functional neuroimaging studies have shown that minimal conscious state and persistent vegetative state have different patterns of residual brain function and may therefore respond differently to deep brain stimulation. The failure to distinguish between the two conditions in this context can give rise to false expectation, misunderstanding and ill-guided (...)
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