I examine the concept of granting for the sake of the argument in the context of explanatory reasoning. I discuss a situation where S wishes to argue for H1 as a true explanation of evidence E and also decides to grant, for the sake of the argument, that H2 is an explanation of E. S must then argue that H1 and H2 jointly explain E. When H1 and H2 compete for the force of E, it is usually a bad idea (...) for S to grant H2 for the sake of the argument. If H1 and H2 are not positively dependent otherwise, there is a key argumentative move that he will have to make anyway in order to retain a place at the table for H1 at all—namely, arguing that the probability of E given H2 alone is low. Some philosophers of religion have suggested that S can grant that science has successfully provided natural explanations for entities previously ascribed to God, while not admitting that theism has lost any probability. This move involves saying that the scientific explanations themselves are dependent on God. I argue that this “granting” move is not an obvious success and that the theist who grants these scientific successes may have to grant that theism has lost probability. (shrink)