Previous research has shown a source memory advantage for faces presented in negative contexts. As yet it remains unclear whether participants remember the specific type of context in which the faces were presented or whether they can only remember that the face was associated with negative valence. In the present study, participants saw faces together with descriptions of two different types of negative behaviour and neutral behaviour. In Experiment 1, we examined whether the participants were able to discriminate between two (...) types of other-relevant negative context information (cheating and disgusting behaviour) in a source memory test. In Experiment 2, we assessed source memory for other-relevant negative (threatening) context information (other-aggressive behaviour) and self-relevant negative context information (self-aggressive behaviour). A multinomial source memory model was used to separately assess partial source memory for the negative valence of the behaviour and specific source memory for the particular type of negative context the face was associated with. In Experiment 1, source memory was specific for the particular type of negative context presented (i.e., cheating or disgusting behaviour). Experiment 2 showed that source memory for other-relevant negative information was more specific than source memory for self-relevant information. Thus, emotional source memory may vary in specificity depending on the degree to which the negative emotional context is perceived as threatening. (shrink)

In the present dissertation, I propose a general, robust, and objective characteristic of the information environment, according to which negative information is more diverse than positive information. I present an explanatory framework for this phenomenon based on the non-extremity of positive qualities. Specifically, most attribute dimensions host one “positive” range which is surrounded by two distinct “negative” ranges, resulting in a greater diversity of negative compared to positive attributes, stimuli, and information in general. Chapter 1 of my dissertation reviews evidence (...) for the proposed greater diversity of negative information, showing that positive stimuli are consistently perceived as more similar than negative stimuli. Chapter 2 presents a line of research that demonstrates the same phenomenon in the domain of person perception. People perceive other people they like as more similar to one another than other people they dislike. I further suggest that the greater diversity of negative information as an “extrapsychic” phenomenon can account for a number of valence asymmetries in information processing that have previously been explained based on “intrapsychic” affective reactions. In line with this idea, Chapter 3 presents research showing that negative words enjoy a recognition advantage over positive words because they are more diverse. Chapter 4 discusses limitations, open questions and further implications of the current empirical findings and of the explanatory framework provided. (shrink)