Under the influence of naturalistic approaches, contemporary philosophy of science tends to characterize scientific objectivity not by virtue of the individualistic following of rules or satisfying epistemic utilities, but as a property arising from the organisational features of groups. This paper presents a critical review of one such proposal, that of Helen Longino, probing some of its main features against the debate between Pasteur and Pouchet in mid-nineteenth-century France regarding the spontaneous generation of life. After considering some weaknesses and strengths, (...) it is argued that Longino’s social epistemology is only able to generate normativity by implicitly assuming a classic procedural notion of epistemic acceptability. The paper also aims to use this historical case to shed light on the complex, multidimensional nature of the dynamics of actual science, arguing both against purely epistemic and exclusively social approaches in a satisfactory meta-scientific explanation of controversies. (shrink)

Louis Pasteur’s defeat of belief in spontaneous generation has been a classical rationalist example of how the experimental approach of modern science can reveal superstition. Farley and Geison told a counter-story of how Pasteur’s success was due to political and ideological support rather than superior experimental science. They claimed that Pasteur violated proper norms of scientific method, and that the French Academy of Science did not see this, or did not want to. Farley and Geison argued that Pouchet’s experiments were (...) as valid as those of Pasteur. In this paper I argue that the core of the scientific debate was not general theories for or against spontaneous generation but the outcome of specific experiments. It was on the conduct of these experiments that the Academy made judgements favorable to Pasteur. Claude Bernard was a colleague of Pasteur, supportive and sometimes critical. I argue that Bernard’s fact-oriented methodology of “experimental medicine” is a better guide to explaining the controversy than the hypothetic-deductive view of scientific method typical of logical empiricism. (shrink)

Anton de Bary is best known for his elucidation of the life cycle of Phytopthora infestans, the causal organism of late blight of potato and the crop losses that caused famine in nineteenth-century Europe. But while practitioner histories often claim this accomplishment as a founding moment of modern plant pathology, closer examination of de Bary's experiments and his published work suggest that his primary motiviation for pursing this research was based in developmental biology, not agriculture. De Bary shied away from (...) making any recommendations for agricultural practice, and instead focused nearly exclusively on spontaneous generation and fungal development – both concepts promoted through prize questions posted by the Académie des Sciences in the 1850s and 1860s. De Bary's submission to the Académie's 1859 Alhumbert prize question illustrates his own contributions to debates about spontaneous generation and demonstrates the practical applications of seemingly philosophical questions – such as the origin of life. (shrink)