In this paper I will argue that a profile of the pseudo-sciences can be gained from the scientific pretensions of the pseudo-scientist. These pretensions provide two yardsticks which together take care of the charge of scientific prejudice that any suggested demarcation of pseudo-science has to face. To demonstrate that my analysis has teeth I will apply it to Freud and modern-day Bach-kabbalists. Against Laudan I will argue that the problem of demarcation is not a pseudo-problem, though the discussion will bear (...) out that Laudan's replacement question, namely the question whether someone's theory is well-confirmed, is not, as Lugg claimed, independent of the question as to whether that person is a pseudo-scientist. I further argue that my prototype pseudo-scientists do not have the shortcomings highlighted in Thagard's recent analysis of pseudo-science. (shrink)

The guiding idea of Patricia Kitcher's Freud's Dream is that the use of interdisciplinary methodology accounts at the same time for the most central features of Freud's theory of the mind and for its most serious shortcomings. Kitcher proposes to provide an account of Freud's theory that illuminates its interdisciplinary underpinnings. While she indisputably succeeds in providing a subtle and rich reconstruction of Freud's work, her attempt to show up the limitations of interdisciplinary studies does not work. The value of (...) her account is attributable not to the idea that Freud's was a flawed interdisciplinary endeavour but to a contextually and historically sensitive approach that makes explicit and elucidates the norms of explanation at work in his method of theory construction and that takes into account the multifaceted nature of his scientific practice. (shrink)

In this article I defend Freud’s method of dream interpretation against those who criticise it as involving a fallacy—namely, the reverse causal fallacy—and those who criticise it as permitting many interpretations, indeed any that the interpreter wants to put on the dream. The first criticism misconstrues the logic of the interpretative process: it does not involve an unjustified reversal of causal relations, but rather a legitimate attempt at an inference to the best explanation. The judgement of whether or not a (...) particular interpretation is the best explanation depends on the details of the case in question. I outline the kinds of probabilities involved in making the judgement. My account also helps to cash out the metaphors of the jigsaw and crossword puzzles that Freudians have used in response to the ‘many interpretations’ objection. However, in defending Freud’s method of dream interpretation, I do not thereby defend his theory of dreams, which cannot be justified by his interpretations alone. (shrink)

In September 2007, more than 100 philosophers came to Prague with the determination to approach Karl Popper's philosophy as a source of inspiration in many areas of our intellectual endeavor. This volume is a result of that effort.