The Rhetoric to Alexander (about 340 B.C.) contains a list of proofs (pisteis) and other types of argumentation which may be seen as the oldest surviving typology of argumentation schemes (avant la lettre). In the present article this typology is derived and compared with modern proposals. The conclusion is that the oldest typology is surprisingly similar to the most recent classifications.

The paper argues that the arguments from probability so popular in early Greek rhetoric and oratory essentially operate by appealing to common positions shared by both speaker and audience. Particularly in controversial debate provoked by fundamental dissensus they make their claim acceptable to the audience by pointing out a basic coherence or congruence of the speaker’s narrative with the audience’s own pre-established standards or standards of knowledge.

This essay contributes to our understanding of pre-Aristotelian concepts of argument by examining the works of the Attic rhetorician Isocrates. Isocrates employed a quasi-technical vocabulary and described conditions under which various types of arguments more or less proper. By careful abstraction we can see what he meant by these terms and conditions. Though not an original argument theorist, per se, Isocrates provides us with a window into pre-Aristotelian argumentation.