The death of Peter Winch in 1997 sparked a revived interest in his work with this book arguing his work suffered misrepresentation in both recent literature and in contemporary critiques of his writing. Debates in philosophy and sociology about foundational questions of social ontology and methodology often claim to have adequately incorporated and moved beyond Winch's concerns. Re-establishing a Winchian voice, the authors examine how such contentions involve a failure to understand central themes in Winch's writings and that the issues (...) which occupied him in his Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy and later papers remain central to social studies. The volume offers a careful reading of the text in alliance with Wittgensteinian insights and alongside a focus on the nature and results of social thought and inquiry. It draws parallels with other movements in the social studies, notably ethnomethodology, to demonstrate how Winch's central claim is both more significant and more difficult to transcend than sociologists and philosophers have hitherto imagined. (shrink)

outrageous remarks about contradictions. Perhaps the most striking remark he makes is that they are not false. This claim first appears in his early notebooks (Wittgenstein 1960, p.108). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that contradictions (like tautologies) are not statements (Sätze) and hence are not false (or true). This is a consequence of his theory that genuine statements are pictures.

This paper revisits Wittgenstein’s heavily criticized claims about the admissibility of inconsistencies in mathematics. It argues from the perspective of mathematics as a tool and combines material from the history and practice of engineering that makes Wittgenstein’s claims about contradiction and inconsistency look much more plausible. Against this background, the paper interprets passages from Wittgenstein, including his exchange with Alan Turing where he highlights that basic laws of thought are at issue and that reflecting on them would be “the most (...) important thing” he has talked about. (shrink)

Is philosophy the pursuit of knowledge, as first year students with a dictionary sometimes write? With an aim to inspire and encourage philosophical inquiry, offering an invitation to participate in a process of discovery? Or are philosophers charged with teaching the history of such pursuits – who argued, proved, disproved what? On the first account, philosophy is a subject that resists information-transmission, and requires exploration, creativity, discussion and dialogue. On the second, teaching centres on information-transmission, etching old ideas into the (...) minds of budding scholars, in short time slots. Though there need not be a division, there is a need to recognise where approaches differ. In this way, we can ensure sufficient time and space for the sometimes unquantifiable: imaginative, creative pursuits in philosophy, with space for independent, original thinking. This paper explores these ideas alongside approaches to teaching, and offers a paradigm for incorporating dialogue in the learning an... (shrink)

The mooronic solution to the surprise quiz paradox says students know there will be a surprise quiz one day this week but they lose this knowledge on the penultimate day. This is because ‘there will be a surprise quiz one day this week’ then becomes an instance of Moore's paradox. This view has surprising consequences. Furthermore, even though the surprise quiz announcement becomes an instance of Moore's paradox on the penultimate day, this does not prevent the students from knowing the (...) quiz is coming. I conclude that the first stage of the paradoxical argument succeeds and the mooronic solution fails. (shrink)

The central supposition of the sceptical controversy regarding rationality in the theory of argumentation is that either there are universal standards against which the reasonableness of arguments can be evaluate or, conversely, that there are no determinate standards against which arguments can be evaluated, and hence no methods by which disputes can be rationally resolved. The paper argues that the basic terms of this debate are erroneously defined and that there is a middle path in this sceptical controversy. The paper (...) adopts the later Wittgensteinian approach to language and applies it to the concept of rationality. Furthermore, it maintains that the search for universal standards of reasonableness in theories of argumentation is likely to come to naught, and that, nonetheless, there are discoverable methods by which arguments are evaluated, facts constituted, and disputes resolved. (shrink)