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If that were true I would have heard about it by now

In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 92–108 (2011)

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  1. Epistemic Dependence and Oppression: A Telling Relationship.Ezgi Sertler - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):394-408.
    Epistemic dependence refers to our social mechanisms of reliance in practices of knowledge production. Epistemic oppression concerns persistent and unwarranted exclusions from those practices. This article examines the relationship between these two frameworks and demonstrates that attending to their relationship is a fruitful practice for applied epistemology. Paying attention to relations of epistemic dependence and how exclusive they are can help us track epistemically oppressive practices. In order to show this, I introduce a taxonomy of epistemic dependence. I argue that (...)
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  • Deliberation and confidence change.Nora Heinzelmann & Stephan Hartmann - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-13.
    We argue that social deliberation may increase an agent’s confidence and credence under certain circumstances. An agent considers a proposition H and assigns a probability to it. However, she is not fully confident that she herself is reliable in this assignment. She then endorses H during deliberation with another person, expecting him to raise serious objections. To her surprise, however, the other person does not raise any objections to H. How should her attitudes toward H change? It seems plausible that (...)
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  • Extremists are more confident.Nora Heinzelmann & Viet Tran - 2022 - Erkenntnis (5).
    Metacognitive mental states are mental states about mental states. For example, I may be uncertain whether my belief is correct. In social discourse, an interlocutor’s metacognitive certainty may constitute evidence about the reliability of their testimony. For example, if a speaker is certain that their belief is correct, then we may take this as evidence in favour of their belief, or its content. This paper argues that, if metacognitive certainty is genuine evidence, then it is disproportionate evidence for extreme beliefs. (...)
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  • Informed Consent, Error and Suspending Ignorance: Providing Knowledge or Preventing Error?Arnon Keren & Ori Lev - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):351-368.
    The standard account of informed consent has recently met serious criticism, focused on the mismatch between its implications and widespread intuitions about the permissibility of conducting research and providing treatment under conditions of partial knowledge. Unlike other critics of the standard account, we suggest an account of the relations between autonomy, ignorance, and valid consent that avoids these implausible implications while maintaining the standard core idea, namely, that the primary purpose of the disclosure requirement of informed consent is to prevent (...)
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  • Epistemic Coverage and Argument Closure.Catherine E. Hundleby - 2020 - Topoi 40 (5):1051-1062.
    Sanford Goldberg’s account of epistemic coverage constitutes a special case of Douglas Walton’s view that epistemic closure arises from dialectical argument. Walton’s pragmatic version of epistemic closure depends on dialectical norms for closing an argument, and epistemic coverage operates at the limits of argument closure because it minimizes dialectical exchange. Such closure works together with a shared hypothetical consideration to justify dismissal of surprising claims.
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