This paper defends the usefulness of the concept of philosophical progress and the common assumption that philosophy and science aim to make the same, or a comparable, kind of progress. It does so by responding to Yafeng Shan's (2022) arguments that the wealth of research on scientific progress is not applicable or useful to philosophy, and that philosophy doesn't need a concept of progress at all. It is ultimately argued that while Shan's arguments are not successful, they reveal the way (...) forward in developing accounts of philosophical progress. (shrink)

In recent years, several philosophers have argued that their discipline makes no progress (or not enough in comparison to the “hard sciences”). A key argument for this pessimistic position appeals to the purported fact that philosophers widely and systematically disagree on most major philosophical issues. In this paper, we take a step back from the debate about progress in philosophy specifically and consider the general question: How (if at all) would disagreement within a discipline undermine that discipline’s progress? We reject (...) two arguments from disagreement to a lack of progress, and spell out two accounts of progress on which progress is compatible with disagreements that persist or increase over time. However, we also argue that disagreement can undermine our ability to tell which developments are progressive (and to what degree). So, while disagreement can indeed be a threat to progress, the precise nature of the threat has not been appreciated. (shrink)

Humanistic management requires an expansion of economistic management to focus on flourishing for all at work through dignity and well-being. A dignity framework engaging the humanistic management perspective is used to explore mattering in organizational contexts. The framework acknowledges moral and spiritual levels of the human experience and incorporates transcendent and religious motivations, representing a more fully humanistic conception. Existential and interpersonal mattering are linked to various levels of the dignity experience at work, providing a practical way of understanding a (...) highly philosophical concept. Implications of mattering at work for humanistic management research, theory, and practice are discussed. Dignity and mattering provide important, human-centered, relationally-oriented concepts to help us understand how people live and experience their lives at work. (shrink)

In this paper, I describe some strategies for teaching an introductory philosophy of science course to Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) students, with reference to my own experience teaching a philosophy of science course in the Fall of 2020. The most important strategy that I advocate is what I call the “Second Philosophy” approach, according to which instructors ought to emphasize that the problems that concern philosophers of science are not manufactured and imposed by philosophers from the outside, but (...) rather are ones that arise internally, during the practice of science itself. To justify this approach, I appeal to considerations from both educational research and the epistemology of testimony. In addition, I defend some distinctive learning goals that philosophy of science instructors ought to adopt when teaching STEM students, which include rectifying empirically well-documented shortcomings in students’ conceptions of the “scientific method” and the “nature of science.” Although my primary focus will be on teaching philosophy of science to STEM students, much of what I propose can be applied to non-philosophy majors generally. Ultimately, as I argue, a successful philosophy of science course for non-philosophy majors must be one that advances a student’s science education. The strategies that I describe and defend here are aimed at precisely that end. (shrink)

Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This paper looks to the comparatively mature debate about scientific progress (...) for inspiration on how to formulate four distinct accounts of philosophical progress, in terms of truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, and understanding. Equally importantly, the paper outlines a common framework for how to understand and evaluate these accounts. We distill a series of lessons from this exercise, to help pave the way for a more fruitful discussion about philosophical progress in the future. (shrink)

Far from baking bread, far from practical applicability, philosophy traditionally sought to explain the world, ideally so. Thus, when Marx argued that it was high time philosophy “change the world,” his was a revolutionary challenge. Today, philosophy is an analytic affair and analytic philosophers seek less to explain the world than to squirrel out arguments or, more descriptively, to resolve the minutiae of this or that name problem. Faced with diminishing student demand, analytic philosophers have taken to urging that everyone (...) from primary school students to scientists be required to study philosophy. Just so, applied philosophers demand to be engaged as consultants on practical projects. Granting that the demand that philosophers be appointed to public policy projects is understandable, inasmuch as everyone, as Hegel observed, desires recognition, this article argues that no argument has been made that the results would benefit any but the appointees while reinforcing current administrative... (shrink)

Skinner claimed when outlining his behaviorist philosophy, that concepts exist in the world before anyone identifies them, yet that they are inherently linked to social and cultural descriptions and predictions. The perspective has been dismissed by many researchers in the learning sciences as an important but obsolete relic in origin narratives introducing perspectives. In such a narrative, behaviorism is portrayed as incompatible with complex domains related to agency, emotion and engagement. However, researchers have started to consider its benefits when taking (...) the necessary and required steps to provide a clear analysis of sequential learning tasks on a materialistic level. Following the recent trend of defending behaviorism, the presented paper creatively explores the valuable and useful functions of behaviorist philosophy that are integral to research associated with design, teacher professional development, and digital ubiquitous technology. The paper aims to provide a philosophical foundation for further discussion of a scientific methodology by relating basic conceptual underpinnings of behaviorism to different domains and levels of analysis integral to the networked sociocultural perspective. (shrink)