En este artículo presento una clasificación de las teorías éticas acerca del aborto provocado. En esa clasificación utilizo dos criterios que, aunque inseparables, se pueden tratar relativamente disociados uno del otro. En primer lugar, presento las teorías ordenadas según el estatuto ontológico y ético que otorgan a los gametos, cigotos, preembriones, embriones, fetos y neonatos, y discuto las teorías basadas en la idea de potencialidad. En segundo lugar, me refiero a las teorías centradas en la libertad de la madre. En (...) las consideraciones finales reconozco explícitamente el partidismo de la teoría de teorías propuesta. (shrink)

In recent discussions, it has been argued that a theory of animal rights is at odds with a liberal abortion policy. In response, Francione (1995) argues that the principles used in the animal rights discourse do not have implications for the abortion debate. I challenge Francione’s conclusion by illustrating that his own framework of animal rights, supplemented by a relational account of moral obligation, can address the moral issue of abortion. I first demonstrate that Francione’s animal rights position, which grounds (...) moral consideration in sentience, is committed to the claim that a sentient fetus has a right to life. I then illustrate that a fully developed account of animal rights that recognizes the special obligations humans have to assist animals when we cause them to be dependent and vulnerable through our voluntary actions or omissions is committed to the following: a woman also has a special obligation to assist a sentient fetus when she causes it to be dependent and vulnerable through her voluntary actions or omissions. From these considerations, it will become evident that a fully developed and consistent animal rights ethic does in fact have implications for the abortion discussion. (shrink)

In this essay, I attempt to provide answers to the following four queries concerning the metaphysics of early human embryogenesis. (1) Following its first cellular fission, is it coherent to claim that one and only one of two “blastomeric” twins of a human zygote is identical with that zygote? (2) Following the fusion of two human pre-embryos, is it coherent to claim that one and only one pre-fusion pre-embryo is identical with that postfusion pre-embryo? (3) Does a live human being (...) come into existence only when its brain comes into existence? (4) At implantation, does a pre-embryo become a mere part of its mother? I argue that either if things have quidditative properties or if criterialism is false, then queries (1) and (2) can be answered in the affirmative; that in light of recent developments in theories of human death and in light of a more “functional” theory of brains, query (3) can be answered in the negative; and that plausible mereological principles require a negative answer to query (4). (shrink)

The concept of brain birth has assumed a position of some significance in discussions on the status of the human embryo and on the point in embryonic development prior to which experimental procedures may be undertaken on human embryos. This paper reviews previous discussions of this concept, which have placed brain birth at various points between 12 days' and 20 weeks' gestation and which have emphasised the symmetry of brain birth and brain death. Major developmental features of brain development are (...) outlined, including the gradualness with which new features generally appear, and also the electroencephalogram (EEG) characteristics of premature infants. From this it is concluded that, if the concept of brain birth is a valid one, it should be placed at 24-28 weeks' gestation. More importantly, it is concluded that the differences between brain development and brain death throw doubt on the concept itself. (shrink)

The Brain Death Reconsidered – Is It a Tenable Concept? Since 1968 it has been recognized in the medical practice that irreversible coma connected with apnea can serve as a criterion of human death. This approach was first introduced in the so called Harvard Protocol. As a result of the work of this commission, the brain-based criteria of human death were quickly legally introduced in America and in most countries in the world. The only symptom on which death can be (...) pronounced is, according to this new definition, the absence of spontaneous brain function. However, the acceptance of the new definition of death did not eliminate the old one completely. In many states both old and new definitions of death are legally valid. Practically, in these countries the alternative definition of death functions alongside the old one and diagnosis of death can be based both on the cardiac/respiratory and brain symptoms. One of the few exceptions proved to be Japan. The law in this country does not provide a uniform answer to the question of what human death is. Instead, it allows people to choose between traditional death and brain death. The law states that if a person wants to be an organ donor after brain death has occurred, he or she must record that intention on a donor card or label beforehand. Those who object to brain death and transplantation do not need donor cards. They are considered to be alive until the heart stops beating. In this way the Japanese law respects the opinion of 20-40% of the society who do not believe in the brain death. The opinion of the same percentage of people in Western societies who oppose BD is ignored by their legal systems. Initially the concept of BD did not cause a lot of controversy but this situation changed in the nineties of the last century. Since then many authors have criticized the validity of the brain-based criteria of death. They maintain that it is impossible to declare the absence of all the functions of the whole brain on the basis of the clinical tests supposed to detect it. There may be present some level of consciousness in brain death (BD) patients and therefore, they may feel pain. It is significant that 27% of the members of the teams which perform the excision of the heart for transplantation think that they are killing a living person and that in many countries during this operation a normal general anesthesia is required because of the vivid reaction of the body of the patient. The opponents of the brain death theory stress that the accurate examination of the so-called brain dead persons shows the persistence of the functions of significant parts of their brains. There are EEG waves recorded in 20-40% of BD patients. Event related potentials (ERP) show the reaction to verbal and non-verbal stimuli and the hormone production by the brain tissue can be detected in many BD people. The proper treatment could not only significantly prolong lives of the BD patients, but around 60% of possible donors with the lowest result of 3 in Glasgow Coma Scale could be restored to normal life if their brain edema is properly treated. This treatment should be based on the therapeutic hypothermia connected with the application of the thyroid hormones, whose level is usually too low in the patients with the brain injury. There is a growing lack of consensus regarding the issue of brain death, especially among physicians. Some regard brain death as a biological one, some as the death of the person but not of the human body, and the rest, as a definition accepted by the society, which doesn’t require other legitimacy than the freely chosen criteria. The brain death concept is also criticized from the philosophical point of view. The strength of the brain death theory was based on the premise that the brain is the integrating center of the body. According to this argument, the death of the brain means that the organism ceases to exist for it is no longer a functioning whole. To this argument the opponents of the brain death concept say that this question is not a question a priori but an empirical one and that the empirical data validate the opposite opinion, which says that the bodies of brain dead patients are alive. Some widely known cases show that even the real death of the entire brain means the death of the body and, therefore, may not signify the death of a human person. The integration of the body is the function of the organism as a whole and not of a single organ, even if this organ is the brain. This point of view can be confirmed by the opinion of St. Thomas Aquinas who says that the soul is primarily and per se connected with the body as a whole as the proportionate perfectible and only secondarily with the parts of the body, according to their ordination to the whole. So, the death of any single organ does not preclude the union of the soul with the rest of the body as a living whole. Moreover, the terms such as “consciousness” and “person” should not be identified. The term such as “human living nonpersons”, proposed by some bioethicists and referring to the people without consciousness has not been accepted in the official documents concerning BD. Bodies of the BD people are alive, therefore, it is not right to use the term “brain death” to describe the state of these patients, but rather the term “brain failure” should be used. As the result, according to some authors, the dead donor rule should be abolished. The Catholic Church stresses the sacredness of the human life from the beginning to the end. Therefore She requires that there be no doubts that the donor in BD is really dead. Because of the lack of consensus among physicians, philosophers and theologians, the popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI decided to continue the scientific research and discussion concerning BD between the representatives of various disciplines. Keywords: brain death, brain edema, global ischemic penumbra, therapeutic hypothermia, consciousness, person, substantial form. (shrink)

The possible symmetry between the concepts of brain death and brain birth (life) is explored. Since the symmetry argument has tended to overlook the most appropriate definition of brain death, the fundamental concepts of whole brain death and higher brain death are assessed. In this way, a context is provided for a discussion of brain birth. Different writers have placed brain birth at numerous points: 25-40 days, eight weeks, 22-24 weeks, and 32-36 weeks gestation. For others, the concept itself is (...) open to question. Apart from this, it needs to be asked whether a unitary concept is an oversimplification. The merits of defining two stages of brain birth, to parallel the two definitions of brain death, are discussed. An attempt is then made to map these various stages of brain birth and brain death onto a developmental continuum. Although the results hold biological interest, their ethical significance is less evident. Development and degeneration are not interchangeable, and definitions of death apply specifically to those who are dying, not those who are developing. I conclude that while a dual concept of brain death has proved helpful, a dual concept of brain birth still has problems, and the underlying concept of brain birth itself continues to be elusive. (shrink)

This paper argues that the central issue in the abortion debate has not changed since 1967 when the English parliament enacted the Abortion Act. That central issue concerns the moral status of the human fetus. The debate here is not, it is argued, primarily a moral debate, but rather a metaphysical debate and/or a theological debate—though one with massive moral implications. It concerns the nature and attributes that an entity requires to have “full moral standing” or “moral inviolability” including a (...) “right to life”. It concerns the question when, in its development from newly fertilised ovum to unequivocally mature, autonomous morally inviolable person does a human being acquire that nature and those attributes, and thus a “right to life”. The paper briefly reviews standard answers to these questions, outlining some problems associated with each. Finally there is a brief discussion of one way in which the abortion debate has changed since 1967—notably in the increasingly vociferous claim, especially from disability rights sectors, that abortion on grounds of fetal abnormality implies contempt for and rejection of disabled people—a claim that is rebutted. (shrink)

Over the past several decades, geneticists have succeeded in identifying the genetic mutations associated with disease. New strategies for treatment, including gene transfer and gene therapy, are under development. Although genetic science has been welcomed for its potential to predict and treat disease, interventions may become ethically objectionable if they threaten to alter characteristics that are distinctively human. Before we can determine whether or not a genetic technique carries this risk, we must clarify what it means to be “human”. This (...) paper inquires how “humanness” has been defined within various academic fields. The views of several legal theoreists, scientists, bioethicists, psychologists, philosophers and anthropologists whose works seem to best reflect how “humanness” is understood in their respective fields of study are considered. Our survey attempts to chart a path for a more detailed study on the meaning of “humanness” in the future. (shrink)