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  1. The meaning of 'good' and the possibility of value.Philip Clark - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):31 - 38.
    Moore held that to call something good is to ascribe a property to it. But he denied that the property could be expressed in non-evaluative terms. Can one accept this view of the meaning of good without falling into skepticism about whether anything can be, or be known to be, good? I suggest a way of doing this. The strategy combines the idea that good is semantically entangled, as opposed to semantically isolated, with the idea that rational agents have a (...)
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  • (1 other version)Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  • (1 other version)Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and A Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 30:260-273.
    Materialists say sensations and other kinds of mental states are physical events. Today, most materialists are neural materialists. They think mental states are neural events or material properties of neural events.Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the physical. A defining property of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something's being correctly termed ‘physical’ Defining properties of the (...)
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