This paper takes as its starting point Kant's analysis of freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason. From this analysis, two different types of freedom are discerned, formative and instrumental freedom. The paper suggests that much of what passes for the pedagogy of learning in UK universities takes the form of an instrumental freedom. This, however, involves the neglect of formative freedom—the power to put learning to question. An emancipatory concept of education requires that formative freedom lies at the heart (...) of the educative endeavour, to which learning must be seen as secondary. The proposal of the two types of freedom is based on a relatively detailed consideration of Kant's Critique—this is necessary in order to ensure that the concepts of instrumental and formative freedom have a credible philosophical basis. (shrink)

A previous study has justified the idea that a politically liberal conception of formal education can be applied in a developing democracy if such a society has reached a narrow overlapping consensus on its education system or modifies its education system from a minimally coercive perspective. This study further considers the fundamental question of how to determine such an educational account’s curriculum elements. In this sense, this study aims to provide a perspective on determining some core curriculum elements of a (...) politically liberal conception of formal education, while focusing its attention to developing democracies. (shrink)

This paper takes as its starting point Kant's analysis of freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason. From this analysis, two different types of freedom are discerned, formative and instrumental freedom. The paper suggests that much of what passes for the pedagogy of learning in UK universities takes the form of an instrumental freedom. This, however, involves the neglect of formative freedom—the power to put learning to question. An emancipatory concept of education requires that formative freedom lies at the heart (...) of the educative endeavour, to which learning must be seen as secondary. The proposal of the two types of freedom is based on a relatively detailed consideration of Kant's Critique—this is necessary in order to ensure that the concepts of instrumental and formative freedom have a credible philosophical basis. (shrink)

We establish the thesis that in moral education, particularly in the first years of the child’s development, unreflexive acts or unreflexiveness in certain behaviours of adults is a condition for the development of the personality structure and virtues that enable autonomous ethical reflection and a relation to the Other. With the notion of unreflexiveness we refer to resolvedness in the response of adults when it is necessary to establish a limit, or cut, in the child’s demand for pleasure, as well (...) as to resolvedness as one of the structurally essential elements in behaviours with which the adult subordinates the child to the symbolic order or language. In philosophy, a symptomatic position in this context is represented by Kant’s theory of education. On the basis of the “traditional” concept of “negative education”, and through Freud’s and Lacan’s psychoanalytic concepts, we identify two principles that should, in contemporary times, be an essential part of the moral educational behaviours of adults: the principle of a delimited response to the child’s demand for the satisfaction of pleasure, and the principle of reasoned, reflected, but nevertheless certain, persevering, resolved unreflexiveness in the subordination of the child’s desire to the symbolic order . On the basis of the preceding analysis, we highlight certain consequences of this structure of the subject for the contexts of particular theoretical discussions and for school practice. (shrink)

What are the conditions required for becoming better human beings? What are our limitations and possibilities? I understand “becoming better” as a combined improvement process bringing persons “up from” a negative condition and “up to” a positive one. Today there is a tendency to understand improvement in a one-sided way as a movement up to the mastery of cognitive skills, neglecting the negative conditions that can make these skills mis-educative. I therefore tell six stories in the Western tradition about conditions (...) for a combined improvement process. The first three stories belong to our cultural ABC: an Aristotelian story about moral wisdom which brings people up from being enslaved by passions and up to a good life of virtues; a Biblical story about God’s word bringing listeners up from a self-centred life and up into creative work as God’s fellow workers, and a short Cave story by Plato about liberation—up from living by common illusions and up to enlightenment from what is perfectly good. The subsequent three stories interpret and actualise these basic stories in different ways: a story about moral wisdom and divine love (Thomas Aquinas), a story about individual freedom and rationality (Immanuel Kant), and a story about the love that builds us up as equal human beings (Søren Kierkegaard). These stories may directly guide us adults—and indirectly the children and youth who learn from our examples—when we struggle to become better human beings. (shrink)

Against narrow understandings of educational research, this article defends the relevance of philosophical anthropology to ethico-political education and contests its lack of space in the philosophy of education. My approximation of this topic begins with comments on philosophical anthropology; proceeds with examples from the history of educational ideas that illustrate what is at stake in placing realism, impossibility and education side by side; and moves to what anthropologically counts as realism or realistic expectations from education. The etymology of the word (...) ‘education’ allows us to unveil educational connections with human nature that demarcate (im)possibility and thematize essentialism. By investigating various questions concerning human nature, philosophical anthropology becomes important for exploring the aims and scope of education in their utopian or anti-utopian framings. (shrink)