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  1. Verbal Disputes and Deep Conceptual Disagreements.Daniel Cohnitz - 2020 - TRAMES 24:279-294.
    To say that a philosophical dispute is ‘merely verbal’ seems to be an important diagnosis. If that diagnosis is correct for a particular dispute, then the right thing to do would be to declare that dispute to be over. The topic of what the disputing parties were fighting over was just a pseudo-problem (thus not really a problem), or at least – if there is a sense in which also merely verbal disputes indicate some problem, for example, insufficient clarity of (...)
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  • Lessons for Religious Dialogue from a Philosophical Disagreement: Alston and Schellenberg on Religious Commitment.Amir Dastmalchian - 2017 - Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies 14:55-66.
    A disagreement between two philosophers, William Alston and J. L. Schellenberg, on the matter of religious commitment serves to exemplify an important difference between religious believers and religious sceptics. The disagreement occurs in the context of a discussion over the plausibility of Alston’s doxastic practice approach as applied to religious belief. I argue that a close reading of Alston and Schellenberg shows that they do not, despite what they may think, differ greatly from each other. I conclude by drawing some (...)
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