Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Bayes' Theorem is a simple mathematical formula used for calculating conditional probabilities. It figures prominently in subjectivist or Bayesian approaches to epistemology, statistics, and inductive logic. Subjectivists, who maintain that rational belief is governed by the laws of probability, lean heavily on conditional probabilities in their theories of evidence and their models of empirical learning. Bayes' Theorem is central to these enterprises both because it simplifies the calculation of conditional probabilities and because it clarifies significant features of subjectivist position. Indeed, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Metaconfirmation.Denis Zwirn & Herv� P. Zwirn - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (3):195-228.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • (1 other version)Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.
    Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support areconsidered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree ofevidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   86 citations  
  • Partly deductive support in the Popper-Miller argument.Burke Townsend - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):490-496.
    Popper and Miller (1983) have presented an argument purporting to establish the impossibility of inductive probability. Here I discuss critically their characterization of a deductive part of nondeductive support, a point that has not figured centrally in previous responses.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)Probabilité et support inductif. Sur le théorème de Popper-Miller.Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):499-526.
    In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Probabilité et support inductif. Sur le thèoréme de Popper-Miller.Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):499-526.
    In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark