According to the argument scheme approach, to evaluate a given scheme-saturating instance completely does entail asking all critical questions relevant to it. Although this is a central task for argumentation theorists, the field currently lacks a method for providing a complete argument evaluation. Approaching this task at the meta-level, we combine a logical with a substantive approach to the argument schemes by starting from Toulmin’s schema: ‘data, warrant, so claim’. For the yet more general schema: ‘premise; if premise, then conclusion; (...) so conclusion’, we forward a meta-level CQ-list that is arguably both complete and applicable. This list should inform ongoing theoretical efforts at generating appropriate object-level CQs for specific argument schemes. (shrink)

A warrant may be grounded in personal testimony, technical method, or public consensus. The justified choice of a field, in authorizing the warrant and providing further extension of support constitutes a legitimation inference. Complex cases evolve when there are a surplus of good reasons as potential support for a claim, and a choice must be made either to select a single ground for the claim or to advance independently valid reasons, differentially grounded, as support. Complex cases enter the realm of (...) controversy when not all relevant grounds offer the same degree of support or point in the same direction, and a choice to select some grounds and discard others must be justified. The justification of the selection of grounds constitutes a legitimation warrant—a missing element of the Toulmin model. (shrink)

The Toulmin model has been proved useful in law and argumentation theory. This model describes the basic process in justifying a claim, which comprises six elements, i.e., claim (C), data (D), warrant (W), backing (B), qualifier (Q), and rebuttal (R). Specifically, in justifying a claim, one must put forward ‘data’ and a ‘warrant’, whereas the latter is authorized by ‘backing’. The force of the ‘claim’ being justified is represented by the ‘qualifier’, and the condition under which the claim cannot be (...) justified is represented as the ‘rebuttal’. To further improve the model, (Goodnight, Informal Logic 15:41–52, 1993) points out that the selection of a backing needs justification, which he calls legitimation justification. However, how such justification is constituted has not yet been clarified. To identify legitimation justification, we separate it into two parts. One justifies a backing’s eligibility (legitimation justification 1 ; LJ 1 ); the other justifies its superiority over other eligible backings (legitimation justification 2 ; LJ 2 ). In this paper, we focus on LJ 1 and apply it to the legal justification (of judgements) in hard cases for illustration purposes. We submit that LJ 1 refers to the justification of the legal interpretation of a norm by its backing, which can be further separated into several orderable subjustifications. Taking the subjustification of a norm’s existence as an example, we show how it would be influenced by different positions in the philosophy of law. Taking the position of the theory of natural law, such subjustification is presented and evaluated. This paper aims not only to inform ongoing theoretical efforts to apply the Toulmin model in the legal field, but it also seeks to clarify the process in the justification of legal judgments in hard cases. It also offers background information for the possible construction of related AI systems. In our future work, LJ 2 and other subjustifications of LJ 1 will be discussed. (shrink)

In The Uses of Argument, Stephen Toulmin proposed a model for the layout of arguments: claim, data, warrant, qualifier, rebuttal, backing. Since then, Toulmin’s model has been appropriated, adapted and extended by researchers in speech communications, philosophy and artificial intelligence. This book assembles the best contemporary reflection in these fields, extending or challenging Toulmin’s ideas in ways that make fresh contributions to the theory of analysing and evaluating arguments.

Whether abduction is treated as an argument or as an inference, the mainstream view presupposes a tight connection between abduction and inference to the best explanation. This paper critically evaluates this link and supports a narrower view on abduction. Our main thesis is that merely the hypothesis-generative aspect, but not the evaluative aspect, is properly abductive in the sense introduced by C. S. Peirce. We show why equating abduction with IBE unnecessarily complicates argument evaluation by levelling the status of abduction (...) as a third reasoning mode. We also propose a scheme for abductive argument along with critical questions, and suggest retaining abduction alongside IBE as related but distinct categories. (shrink)

This essay offers, as a counterpart to pragma-dialectical argument, a “new rhetoric” produced in the situated discourse of a public forum when a community addresses matters of common urgency and undertakes informed action. Such a rhetoric takes the principles of discourse ethics as its informing dialectic by identifying an interlocutor as one who is obligatedboth to argue effectively,and also to hold open, even reinforce, norms of communicative reason. Implications concerning the study of fallacies and theethos obligations of communicative reasoning are (...) discussed. (shrink)