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  1. Unique events: The underdetermination of explanation.Aviezer Tucker - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (1):61-83.
    The paper explicates unique events and investigates their epistemology. Explications of unique events as individuated, different, and emergent are philosophically uninteresting. Unique events are topics of why-questions that radically underdetermine all their potential explanations. Uniqueness that is relative to a level of scientific development is differentiated from absolute uniqueness. Science eliminates relative uniqueness by discovery of recurrence of events and properties, falsification of assumptions of why-questions, and methodological simplification e.g. by explanatory methodological reduction. Finally, an overview of contemporary philosophical disputes (...)
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  • Reduction in the Social Sciences: The Future or Utopia?Jacek Szmatka - 1989 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (4):425-444.
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  • Science without reduction.Helmut F. Spinner - 1973 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16 (1-4):16 – 94.
    The aim of this essay is a criticism of reductionism ? both in its ?static? interpretation (usually referred to as the layer model or level?picture of science) and in its ?dynamic? interpretation (as a theory of the growth of scientific knowledge), with emphasis on the latter ? from the point of view of Popperian fallibilism and Feyerabendian pluralism, but without being committed to the idiosyncrasies of these standpoints. In both aspects of criticism, the rejection is based on the proposal of (...)
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  • Micro-particles and picturability: A reply.Stephen J. Noren - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):484-487.
    In a recent paper, T. R. Girill claims to have found some difficulties with an earlier paper of mine in which I argued, against A. M. Paul, that in principle, micro-entities are unpicturable. Paul had argued that N. R. Hanson's view, frequently repeated in Patterns of Discovery, to the effect that … atomic particles must lack certain properties; electrons could not be other than unpicturable. The impossibility of visualizing ultimate matter is an essential feature of atomic explanation.
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  • Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part II: Identity in Reduction.C. A. Hooker - 1981 - Dialogue 20 (2):201-236.
    Part I of this trilogy, Historical and Scientific Setting, set out a general context for selecting a certain subclass of inter-theoretic relations as achieving appropriate explanatory and ontological unification – hence for properly being labelled reductive. Something of the complexity of these relations in real science was explored. The present article concentrates on the role which identity plays in structuring the reduction relation and so in achieving ontological and explanatory unification.
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  • Criteria for the part-whole relation in micro-reductions.T. R. Girill - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (1):69-79.
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