One of the themes of this lecture series has to do with the bearing of radical cultural divergencies on the issue of whether or not there is an invariant human nature. Put starkly, the options are between: first, man as a socio-cultural product, which entails that human nature must vary significantly across divergent cultures; second, man as a biological product, which entails (racist theories aside) that human nature is universal and invariant, impervious to cultural influence; and third, man as a (...) mixture or synthesis of these two options. (shrink)

One of the themes of this lecture series has to do with the bearing of radical cultural divergencies on the issue of whether or not there is an invariant human nature. Put starkly, the options are between: first, man as a socio-cultural product, which entails that human nature must vary significantly across divergent cultures; second, man as a biological product, which entails (racist theories aside) that human nature is universal and invariant, impervious to cultural influence; and third, man as a (...) mixture or synthesis of these two options. (shrink)

Three main versions of cognition-arousal theory are distinguished depending on how they interpret the theory’s basic postulate, that an emotion is a function of cognition and arousal: objectivist causal theories, attributional theories, and fusion theories. The objectivist causal and attributional theories each comprise a causal-functional and a part-whole version, and the fusion theory subsumes in particular a categorization and a perceptual integration version. In addition, the attributional version of cognition-arousal theory can be reinterpreted as a theory of emotion self-ascription. Although (...) arousal may in fact not be necessary for emotions, a modified cognition-feeling theory that replaces arousal with intrinsically affective feelings, seems still viable. Arguments are presented why the objectivist causal-functional version of this theory should be preferred. (shrink)