The nosological diagnosis is a particular type of nontheoretical diagnosis consisting of identifying the disease that afflicts the patient without explaining the underlying etiopathological mechanisms. Its origins are within the essentialist point of view on the nature of diseases, which dates back at least to 18th-century taxonomy studies. In this article, we propose a model of nosological diagnosis as a two-phase process composed of the categorization of inductive inferences and argumentations by analogy. In the inductive phase, disease entities are identified (...) by means of typicality-based categorization processes, and meaningful clinical samples are learned (abstract clinical cases, i.e., syndromes and actual cases); in the subsequent phase, those samples are used as the bases of argumentations by analogy to obtain a diagnosis for a given patient. This model extends the prototype resemblance theory of disease including also the exemplar theory proposed in cognitive science and, moreover, it frames the clinical activity of nosological diagnosis and how it can be explained within the theory of argumentation. According to it, diagnosis based on the recognition of a typical syndrome is explained in terms of the prototype theory of categorization and the antisymmetrical argumentation by analogy, while diagnosis based on a comparison with a previous clinical case is explained by the exemplar theory of categorization and by the symmetrical argumentation by analogy. (shrink)

This article draws on Ellul’s analysis of propaganda in understanding propaganda in the helping professions. Key in such an analysis is the interweaving of the psychological and sociological. Contrary to the discourse in mission statements of professional organizations and their codes of ethics calling for informed consent, competence of professionals and taking advantage of research findings, in everyday practice we find a variety of avoidable lapses, including decontextualized problem framing, bogus claims concerning risks, accuracy of assessment measures, and effectiveness of (...) interventions. Perhaps most troubling is obscuring the causes of human problems, for example, framing problems-in-living such as anxiety, alienation, and loneliness that result from living in a technological society as brain disorders, so mystifying the causes of distress. (shrink)