This paper examines the appearance of theôria as metaphor in Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus. Once Oedipus arrives in Colonus, the local site on the outskirts of Athens becomes, in effect, theoric space, as travelers converge upon the site, drawn there to visit the old man, whose narrative is known to all Greeks. Oedipus, as panhellenic figure, serves simultaneously as spectacle and theôros, attaining inner vision as he goes to his death at the end of the play. Oedipus offers salvation to (...) Athens within the logic of the play, but in order to confer benefits upon Athens, he requires the travel and vision of his daughters, Antigone and Ismene, who serve as supplementary theôroi. The essay concludes with a glance at outsiders-as-saviors in Oedipus at Colonus and beyond, with an emphasis on the contribution of female travelers to sôtêria in classical Athenian drama. (shrink)

The first sentence of the Annals reads urbem Romam a principio reges habuere. Commentators observe the echo of Sallust, Catiline 6.1 urbem Romam, sicuti ego accepi, condidere atque habuere initio Troiani, and of Claudius, ILS 212 quondam reges hanc tenuere urbem. In a stimulating recent contribution David Levene also compares the first sentence of Justinus' Epitome of the Histories of Pompeius Trogus: principio rerum gentium nationumque imperium penes reges erat. A fourth potential model may now be taken into consideration: Ἀθηναῖοι (...) τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐχρῶντο βασιλɛίαι. (shrink)

Aristotle's treatment of the choice between the political and contemplative lives (in EN I 5 and X 7-8) can seem awkward. To offer one explanation of this, I argue that when he invokes self-sufficience (autarkeia) as a criterion for this choice, he appeals to two different and incompatible specifications of "lacking nothing." On one specification, suitable to a human being living as a political animal and thus seeking to realize his end as an engaged citizen of a polis, a person (...) lacks nothing by possessing a wide range of goods that directly require other people. On the other, more suitable to a god or a beast, a person lacks nothing by having no need of goods that directly require other people. The ambiguity of this criterion renders the choice between the political and contemplative lives difficult. (shrink)

: The Hellenistic reception of Babylonian horoscopic astrology gave rise to the question of what the planets really do and whether astrology is a science. This question in turn became one of defining the Greco-Latin science of astronomy, a project that took Aristotle's views as a starting-point. Thus, I concentrate on one aspect of the various definitions of astronomy proposed in Hellenistic times, their demarcation of astronomy and physical theory. I explicate the account offered by Geminus and its subordination of (...) astronomy to arguments made in physical theory about what really is the case. I then show how Ptolemy treats the same topic but maintains that this science is sufficient on its own to determine the realia it studies. In this way, I identify two moments in an obvious process of intellectual change that had profound consequences for the history of astronomy and cosmology over the next 1500 years. My hope is that this will advance our understanding of the reception of horoscopic astrology in Hellenistic times and also serve to locate Ptolemy more fully in his intellectual context. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the reception of Plutarch’s Moralia in Theodore Metochites’ Semeioseis gnomikai. It discusses chapter 71 of Metochites’ work, one of several chapters focused on ancient authors, which is dedicated to Plutarch. Metochites praises Plutarch as a wise man and a philosopher and in particular approves of his character. According to Metochites, Plutarch was not tainted by the usual flaws of intellectuals such as envy and arrogance, but was motivated by a pure love of wisdom and generously acknowledged (...) the achievements of his predecessors. Metochites interprets Plutarch’s erudition, polymathia, as a sign of a noble, high-minded nature, and therefore as evidence of moral virtue. (shrink)

It is well known that heliocentrism was proposed in ancient times, at least by Aristarchus of Samos. Given that ancient astronomers were perfectly capable of understanding the great advantages of heliocentrism over geocentrism—i.e., to offer a non-ad hoc explanation of the retrograde motion of the planets and to order unequivocally all the planets while even allowing one to know their relative distances—it seems difficult to explain why heliocentrism did not triumph over geocentrism or even compete significantly with it before Copernicus. (...) Usually, scholars refer to explanations of sociological character. In this paper, I offer a different explanation: that the pre-Copernican heliocentrism was essentially different from the Copernican heliocentrism, in such a way that the adduced advantages of heliocentrism can only be attributed to Copernican heliocentrism, but not to pre-Copernican heliocentrism proposals. (shrink)

Abstract This paper examines a fundamental, though relatively understudied, aspect of the physical theory of the physician Asclepiades of Bithynia, namely his doctrine of pores. My principal thesis is that this doctrine is dependent on a conception of void taken directly from Epicurean physics. The paper falls into two parts: the first half addresses the evidence for the presence of void in Asclepiades' theory, and concludes that his conception of void was basically that of Epicurus; the second half focuses on (...) the precise nature of Asclepiadean pores, and seeks to show that they represent void interstices between the primary particles of matter which are the constituents of the human body, and are thus exactly analogous to the void interstices between atoms within solid objects in Epicurus' theory. (shrink)