This book contains 20 essays tracing the work of David Zarefsky, a leading North American scholar of argumentation from a rhetorical perspective. The essays cohere around 4 general themes: objectives for studying argumentation rhetorically, approaches to rhetorical study of argumentation, patterns and schemes of rhetorical argumentation, and case studies illustrating the potential of studying argumentation rhetorically. These articles are drawn from across Zarefsky’s 45-year career. Many of these articles originally appeared in publications that are difficult to access today, and this (...) collection brings the reader up to date on the topic. Zarefsky’s scholarship focuses on the role of language in political argumentation, the ways in which argumentation creates public knowledge and belief, the influence of framing and context on what is said and understood, the deployment of particular patterns and schemes of argumentation in public reasoning, and the influence of debate on politics and governance. All these topics are addressed in this book. Each of the conceptual essays includes brief application to specific cases, and five extended case studies are also presented in this volume. The case studies cover different themes: two explore famous political debates, the third focuses on presidential rhetoric across the course of United States history, the fourth on the arguments for liberalism at a time of political polarization, and the fifth on the contemporary effort to engage the United States with the Muslim world. This book is of interest to scholars in the fields of philosophy, logic, law, philosophy of law, and legal history. The range of topics and concepts addressed, the interplay of concepts and cases and the unifying perspective of rhetorical argumentation make this book a valuable read for students of argumentative practice, whether rhetorically or otherwise. (shrink)

.The article deals with the difference between some forms of legal positivism. It is argued that, even in continental legal systems which are typically “rule bound,” there is some space left for principles in the legal system. The author tries to explain how this space can be filled and what methods should be used by a judge to do so.

Many public information documents attempt to persuade the recipients that they should engage in or refrain from specific behaviour. This is based on the assumption that the recipient will decide about his or her behaviour on the basis of the information given and a rational evaluation of the pros and cons. An analysis of 20 public information brochures shows that the argumentation in persuasive brochures is often not marked as such. Argumentation is presented as factual information, and in many instances (...) the task of making argumentational links and drawing conclusions is left to the reader. However, since the information offered does follow familiar argumentational schemes, readers can, in principle, reconstruct the argument. All the brochures make use of pragmatic argumentation (argumentation from consequences),i. e.,they formulate at least certain benefits of the desirable behaviour or disadvantages of the undesirable behaviour. In addition, they make regular use of argumentation from cause to effect and argumentation from example. Argumentation from rules and argumentation from authority are less frequently used. This empirical analysis of the use of argumentation schemes is a solid base for interesting and rich hypotheses about the cognitive processing of persuasive brochures. Central processing requires the reader to be able to reconstruct argumentation from informational texts and to identify and evaluate various types of argumentation. (shrink)

We discuss five kinds of representations of rationales and provide a formal account of how they can alter disputation. The formal model of disputation is derived from recent work in argument. The five kinds of rationales are compilation rationales, which can be represented without assuming domain-knowledge (such as utilities) beyond that normally required for argument. The principal thesis is that such rationales can be analyzed in a framework of argument not too different from what AI already has. The result is (...) a formal understanding of rationales, a partial taxonomy, and a foundation for computer programs that represent and reason with rationales.The five kinds of rationales are as follows: (c)ompression and (s)pecialization, which yield rules, and (d)isputation, which yields a decision. These are modeled as potentially changing the focus of the dispute. Then there are (f)it, a rationale for rules, and (r)esolution, a rationale for decisions. These cannot be modeled as simply; they force disputation to a meta-level, at least temporarily. (shrink)

Kratochwil argues that a social-scientific study of the behavior of regimes, and how they exercise power, is a useful method to challenge the exaggerated view of international relations as a “normless anarchy.” By showing how “expectations” dictate action in international affairs, his method asserts the existence of a universal force among nations.

The paper outlines a conceptual framework for the critical assessment of argumentation which differs in some of its core characteristics from conventional approaches: it is resolutely semantic rather than formal in its method; it centers on obligations rather than beliefs; and its analytical focus is on the contingent necessity of conclusions, rather than on their persuasiveness or formal validity. The paper briefly illustrates the applications of this conceptual framework by reanalyzing a couple of examples taken from the argumentation analysis literature.

Kratochwil argues that a social-scientific study of the behavior of regimes, and how they exercise power, is a useful method to challenge the exaggerated view of international relations as a "normless anarchy.".

In this paper, the author develops an instrument for the rational reconstruction of argumentation in which a judicial decision is justified by referring to the consequences in relation to the purpose of the rule. The instrument is developed by integrating insights from legal theory and legal philosophy about the function and use of arguments from consequences in relation to the purpose of a rule into a pragma-dialectical framework. Then, by applying the instrument to the analysis of examples from legal practice, (...) it is demonstrated that the instrument can offer a heuristic and critical tool for the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation that can ‘bridge’ the gap between more abstract discussions of forms of legal argumentation on the one hand, and legal arguments as they occur in actual legal practice on the other hand. (shrink)

In legal theory, it is widely claimed that decisions in hard cases are based on weighing and balancing. However no reconstructions are given of the deep structure of the complex argumentation underlying the justification of these decisions. The author develops a model for the analysis of weighing and balancing of arguments in the justification of judicial decisions that are based on teleological-evaluative considerations. The justification is reconstructed as a complex argumentation that consists of different levels of argumentation and it is (...) explained how these levels of argumentation relate to the burden of proof of a judge who gives a decision that is based on a weighing and balancing in which teleological-evaluative considerations are invoked. (shrink)

This essay discusses the developments and trends of research in legalargumentation of the last 25 years. The essay starts with a survey of thevarious approaches which can be distinguished: the logical approach, therhetorical approach, and the dialogical approach. Then it identifies varioustopics in the research, which constitute the various components of aresearch programme of legal argumentation: the philosophical component, thetheoretical component, the reconstruction component, the empiricalcomponent, and the practical component. It concludes with a discussion ofthe main trends in the research (...) of the last 25 years. (shrink)

I give a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the role of teleological-evaluative argumentation referring to goals and values in the justification of judicial decisions. I establish the role and place of this form of argumentation in complex forms of justification in which the argumentation interacts with other forms of legal argumentation. I will do this by integrating the insights from legal theory and legal philosophy into a pragma-dialectical framework for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation.