This paper explores early Australasian philosophy in some detail. Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: idealism and materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissipated thereafter. Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, but it also reflected the revival of interest in Hegel through the work of ‘absolute idealists’ such as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Henry Jones. A number of the early New Zealand philosophers were also educated in the idealist tradition (...) and were influential in their communities, but produced relatively little. In Australia, materialism gained prominence through the work of John Anderson, who arrived in Australia in 1927, and continues to be influential. John Anderson had been a student of Henry Jones, who might therefore be said to have influenced both main strands of Australian philosophical thought. (shrink)

Policy-makers have attempted to frame the ethical requirements that are relevant to the creation of human beings via reproductive technologies. Various reports and laws enacted in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Britain have introduced tests for how we should weigh child welfare when using these technologies. A number of bioethicists have argued that child welfare should be interpreted as a “best interests” test. Others have argued that there are ethical reasons why we should abandon this kind of test. I will (...) argue that at least some of the relevant policy can be interpreted as requiring those wishing to exercise their procreative liberty to have a reasonable plan to care and nurture any resulting child, thereby respecting the internal preconditions of that liberty. This interpretation of child welfare requirements answers some of the ethical worries about a child welfare test. (shrink)

The value of autonomy is generally stated to be of prime importance in relation to health care. Arising out of this, rights of the patient to and in health care have been extensively discussed and stated, and have found expression in law. There have been minimal statements of the rights of others involved in health care, such as caregivers, and minimal discussion of duties and responsibilities in relation to rights claimed and conferred. The author suggests that no claim to rights (...) in health care should now be accepted without consideration of related duties and responsibilities. (shrink)

Although medical confidentiality is widely recognized as an essential principle in the therapeutic relationship, its systematic and coherent practice has been an ethically challenging duty upon healthcare providers due to various concerns of clinical, moral, religious, social, ethical and legal natures. Medical confidentiality can be breached to protect the patient and/or others if maintaining confidentiality causes serious harm. Healthcare professionals may encounter complicated situations whereby the divulgence of a patient’s confidential information may pose a threat to one party whereas the (...) concealment of such information may cause harm to another. After deliberating on the Islamic concept of harm (ḍarar), this paper focuses on the dual duty and conflicts of interests faced by healthcare professionals in the practice of medical confidentiality. Referring to serious infectious diseases with a special mention of AIDS, this study also provides discourse on how healthcare professionals deal with difficult scenarios of conflicts of interests and ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

Except for the lines of argument we have sketched above, there are not many general conclusions that can be drawn from the ethical and philosophical AIDS discussion at the moment. It may happen that a medical research team comes forward tomorrow or next week with an effective cure for all immunodeficiency-related diseases, including full-blown AIDS, and most of our reflections turn out to be useless from the practical viewpoint. But the formulation of ethical guidelines for medical and social practice is (...) not all there is to moral philosophy. Even after each and every one of the problems dealt with in our study has lost all direct ordinary-life relevance, the principles and their application in new practical situatons remain. Therefore, let us hope that no moral philosopher will be reluctant to participate in the AIDS discussion out of the hopefully well-grounded but rather unethical fear that the problem in its primary medical form will cease to exist in the relatively near future. (shrink)