La influencia de Nietzsche en Heidegger es bien conocida desde sus famosos cursos, impartidos en los años 1930-40 pero tan sólo publicados en 1961. Sin embargo, la publicación de los tratados del Ereignis desde 1989, y la más reciente de los Cuadernos Negros desde 2014 permite reconsiderar el sentido de la lectura heideggeriana y de su confrontación con Nietzsche. En este artículo, y a partir de un análisis detallado de los herméticos textos del pensar del Ereignis, queremos reevaluar y completar (...) el rol de Nietzsche en la historia del Ser. Siguiendo el problemático hilo de la verdad, y de cómo se oponen voluntad de verdad y verdad del Ser, procuraremos mostrar de qué manera el filósofo del martillo es más importante para el pensar del Ereignis de lo que el propio Heidegger reconocía en sus cursos públicos, y que, pese a la radicalidad de su crítica, una proximidad crucial puede establecerse entre ambos. (shrink)

This article examines genealogical investigations in an attempt to explain what they are, how they work, and what purpose they serve. It is a critique of Robert Brandom’s view of genealogists as naïve semanticists who believe that normative thinking, as it relates to all forms of epistemic inquiry and language use, is reducible to naturalistic causes. This reduction, Brandom claims, is hopelessly misguided and semantically incoherent since genealogies are not epistemically neutral in that “they count no more and no less,” (...) as Habermas put it, than the traditional accounts of moral phenomena that they seek to replace. Nietzsche’s “story” of the origin of guilt in On the Genealogy of Morals is thus not even a useful fiction but merely meaningless. My analysis shows that Brandom’s understanding of genealogy is rather simplistic. While genealogists are naturalists insofar as they attempt to discover the specific historical causes that gave rise to current normative practices, they are neither reductive empiricists nor first-stage semanticists, as Brandom calls them, but multidimensional power-pragmatists. (shrink)

I examine three kinds of criticism directed at philosophical genealogy. I call these substantive, performative, and semantic. I turn my attention to a particular substantive criticism that one may launch against essay two of On the Genealogy of Morals that turns on how Nietzsche answers “the time-crunch problem”. On the surface, there is evidence to suggest that Nietzsche accepts a false scientific theory, namely, Lamarck’s Inheritability Thesis, in order to account for the growth of a new human “organ”—morality. I demonstrate (...) that the passages interpreted by some scholars to prove that Nietzsche is a Lamarckian can be reinterpreted along Darwinian lines. I demonstrate that Nietzsche hits upon the right drivers of phenotypical change in humans, namely, torture and enclosures (e.g., walls of early states), but misinterprets their true impact. Nietzsche believes that these technologies are responsible for producing what I call “culture-serving memory” and the bad conscience by causing emotions that once were expressed outwardly to turn inward causing the “psychological digestion” of the human animal. In reality, however, these mechanisms are conducive to breeding a particular type of individual, namely, one who is docile, by introducing artificial and unconscious selective pressures into the environment of early humans. In showing that Nietzsche’s genealogical account of memory and bad conscience is not underpinned on a false scientific theory and is consistent with Neo-Darwinism, I deflect a potentially fatal blow regarding the veracity of Nietzsche’s genealogies. -/- . (shrink)

FOR NIETZSCHE, THERE IS NO TRUTH. WHAT THEN ARE WE TO SAY OF HIS DOCTRINES OF WILL TO POWER AND ETERNAL RECURRENCE WHICH SEEM TO BE HELD AS TRUTHS? THEY TOO ARE ILLUSIONS. BUT, IF SO, HOW CAN ONE HOLD THAT THESE ILLUSIONS ARE TO BE PREFERRED TO OTHER ILLUSIONS? BECAUSE THE HIGHEST STATE IS TO BE THE SOURCE OF ALL VALUE AND MEANING ONESELF WITHOUT RELYING ON AN INDEPENDENT STANDARD OF TRUTH.

Le ton préremptoire de Nietzsche lorsqu'il condescend à parler d'autres penseurs et le style provocateur dans lequel il mesure son propre génie ont rendu ses critiques timides; on le menage comme s'il allait se lever pour écraser son interlocuteur sous les invectives. Tout en assurant qu'il est inimitable et n'a point fait école, ses grands commentateurs se veulent d'abord ses disciples. Us entretiennent un nuage de sacralité autour de textes dont il devient difficile d'aborder l'analyse. Nietzsche a le droit de (...) se contredire, de se tromper sur l'étymologie, d'ignorer la recherche historique érudite de son temps, de ne jamais citer dans le texte les auteurs qu'il attaque, de malmener telle ou telle théorie scientifique: sa hauteur de vue sauve tout. Mais à quel titre les ceuvres de Nietzsche pourraient-elles sérieusement échapper à un regard rigoureux, visant un objet linguistique precis, daté et done assignable dans une tradition? Suffit-il que Nietzsche ait renié d'avance toute interprétation et souhaité de rester incompris? Cela ne paraît ni nécessaire, ni suffisant. (shrink)

The notion of modernism, originally a classificatory term in art and literary criticism, now a common term of art in many philosophic (and anti?philosophic) programs, has remained an elusive, often vague point of view. For a discussion of the notion's historical accuracy and philosophic legitimacy this article selects an author greatly responsible for setting out the problem (called by him ?nihilism') and philosophically sensitive to the issues involved in claiming that something essential to a tradition has ?ended? and something new (...) ?begun?: Nietzsche. Such issues are: what needs to be shown in order to demonstrate that indeed a complete ?break? in a tradition has occurred, especially if part of that claim is that this break ought to have occurred? And: what consequences follow, particularly with respect to the possibility of ?post?modern? ?justification'? Nietzsche's answers to these questions are more subtle than has been appreciated, and can, when pursued properly, help reveal the strengths and weaknesses of such post?Nietzscheans as Heidegger, Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida. (shrink)

La récente étude du R.P. Dubarle sur la dialectique hégélienne est trop riche pour être discutée ici dans son ensemble. Nous nous contentons par conséquent d'en relever une seule thèse, celle précisément qui rattache la philosophie moderne, ou plus exactement certaines des philosophies modernes, à la distinction entre la raison et l'entendement, qui s'est progressivement substituée au cours du XVIe s., du XVIIe s. et du XVIIIe s. à l'ancienne distinction, élaborée déjà par la Grèce antique, entre l'intellect et la (...) raison. Cette thèse joue un rôle fondamental dans l'étude du R.P. Dubarle qui se propose en dernier lieu la formalisation non pas de la logique hégélienne mais de la logique des termes inspirée par l'œuvre de Hegel. Nous ne discuterons pas ici la réalisation de ce projet. Notre propos présent n'est qu'une interrogation sur la correction de la présentation dubarlienne de la distinction en question, une confrontation, en rapport avec celle-ci, entre ce qu'on peut appeler « la philosophie de la raison » et « la philosophie de l'intellect », et, en conséquence, une suggestion sur la voie à suivre pour construire la théorie de la philosophie: la métaphilosophie. (shrink)

The question “Is Hegel a pragmatist?” has been the subject of much debate among specialists in Hegelian philosophy and pragmatism. In this article, I intend to clarify the terms of the problem, and to assess the strengths and weaknesses of two ways of answering this question: the first is to make explicit pragmatic themes in Hegelian thought, and the second is to identify a minimal and negative criterion of rapprochement between Hegelianism and pragmatism. In light of this critical examination, it (...) appears that any general approach to this question is doomed to failure. (shrink)