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Minimal Fregeanism

Mind 131 (522):429-458 (2022)

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Frege Cases and Rationalizing Explanations.Mahrad Almotahari & Aidan Gray - forthcoming - Noûs.details Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional-attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other ‘higher-level’ explanations. Using the framework, we argue for an under-appreciated form of Russellianism. Along the way we demonstrate that being more explicit about (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The transparency of mental vehicles.Michael Murez - 2023 - Noûs:1-28.details Modes of presentation (MOPs) are often said to have to be transparent, usually in the sense that thinkers can know solely via introspection whether or not they are deploying the same one. While there has been much discussion of threats to transparency stemming from externalism, another threat to transparency has gar- nered less attention. This novel threat arises if MOPs are robust, as I argue they should be according to internalist views of MOPs which identify them with represen- tational vehicles, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Samethinking.Romain Bourdoncle - 2022 - Dissertation, École Normale Supérieuredetails This thesis investigates the nature of the relation between mental representations in successful verbal communication, thought attribution, agreement, and disagreement — a relation which I call “samethinking”. The nature of samethinking raises several foundational questions about the nature of (non-natural) meaning, and the cognitive underpinnings of the emergence of culture. It bears on long-lasting puzzles in the philosophy of mind and language (such as Frege’s puzzle and Kripke’s puzzle about belief). Samethinking does not amount to sharing a reference (with “sharing" (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
(1 other version)Bringing transparency to the de se debates.Ekain Garmendia-Mujika - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (3):315-332.details There has been much discussion over the last decade between so-called ‘de se skeptics’ and ‘de se exceptionalists’. The debate concerns claims made by John Perry and David Lewis in 1979 on the basis of some now-famous examples they introduced. In this paper, I argue that different problems and questions have commonly been conflated when approaching these issues, and I reframe the whole debate by appealing to two theses on the transparency of mental content that have been widely overlooked. These (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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