How can citizens construct the political authority under which they will live? I argue that Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) answers this question concerning the constitutive power of political and normative agency by employing four dimensions of mimesis from the Greek and Roman traditions. And I argue that mimesis accounts for the know-how, or power/knowledge, the general ‘man’ draws upon in constructing the commonwealth. Hobbes revalues poetic mimesis through his stylistic decisions, including the invitation to the reader to read ‘himself’ in (...) the portrait of the general man depicted in the text. Hobbes aims for Leviathan to change the ethical dispositions of its readers, turning them from bad to good men as they witness the general man undergoing this ethical transformation in the transition from the state of nature to the civil state. He emphasizes the anthropological dimension of mimesis to explain political disorder since he argues that men assess the honor others attribute them by observing signs and gestures in others’ behavior. Hobbes employs the linguistic dimension of mimesis to describe how men acting as agents can build a normative consensus out of the state of nature. This article positions mimesis as a key term for understanding the intersection between aesthetics and politics before the term ‘aesthetics’ came into parlance. (shrink)

Cet article essaye d’analyser l’ Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnèse de Thucydide à la lumière des thèses ricœuriennes sur l’épistémologie de la connaissance historique, notamment les trois moments essentiels de l’opération historiographique : la preuve documentaire, l’explication/compréhension et l’écriture/représentation. Ce qui nous amène à insérer le texte de Thucydide dans la séquence des trois phases de la mimésis impliquée dans toute mise en discours : préfiguration, configuration, refiguration. Le dialogue que nous établissons entre le philosophe français et l’historien grec (...) nous permet aussi de trouver plusieurs dissimilitudes et similitudes entre les deux, soit en réfléchissant sur la question de la vérité, soit en réfléchissant sur la dialectique entre lire et voir, sous le signe du concept rhétorique de l’ enargeia. (shrink)