In an earlier paper, I set out to apply to animal mimicry the definition of the sign, and, more specifically, of the iconic sign, which I originally elaborated in the study of pictures, and which was then extended by myself and others to language, gesture, and music. The present contribution, however, while summarizing some of the results of those earlier studies, is dedicated to the demonstration that animal mimicry, as well as phenomena of the human Lifeworld comparable to it, are (...) in a sense the opposite of signs. It has often been observed, not only within speech act philosophy, but also by the semiotician Luis Prieto, that as sign can only function as such once it is recognized to be a sign. Animal mimicry, camouflage, and the like, in contrast, only work as such, to the extent that they are not perceived as signs. Unlike what speech act philosophy claims, nevertheless, the “difference which makes a difference” is not the recognition of a purpose attributed to the subject producing the sign. A footprint, for example, has to be recognized as a sign in order to function as such. Nevertheless, to the extent that a purpose is attributed to the subject setting the sign, it may be considered a sign, but one that hides its nature, a fake footprint. Mimicry and camouflage, however, are similar to such “natural meanings” as footprints in entertaining a different relation to the agent initiating the act and the agent perceiving it. Classical studies of mimicry distinguish its varieties according to what is rather vaguely called function. In this paper, we will investigate whether these classifications can be recuperated from a semiotic point of view, or whether a semiotically valid classification should start from scratch. (shrink)

This analysis focuses on the role of appresentational orders in the “building of the lifeworld.” Based in phenomenology and the philosophy of culture, the article contributes to semiotics by further developing some of Göran Sonesson’s ideas on signs. Appresentation means that “absent” data is intended as co-present with a directly perceivable term within the unity of consciousness (Husserl). Alfred Schutz sees “marks,” “indications,” and “signs” as different types of couplings between “present” and “absent” data according to one single cognitive style (...) or “subworld.” These appresentational relations contrast with the more complex “symbols,” which are couplings between different styles or subworlds. For instance, a crucifix may co-present a “Latin cross” given to everyday perception with meanings belonging to the world of religion, making it “symbolically pregnant” (Cassirer). Beyond a mere coupling, appresentation is constituted by appresentational orders, which can reflect high relational complexity. Although Schutz introduced the concept of these orders, he, like Sonesson, misses their full potential for understanding appresentation. Signs and sign-like relations (such as marks and indications), which make possible (life)worldly communication, spatial and temporal orientation, and social organization, can be further differentiated according to the appresentational orders “dominant” in each certain case. In contrast, symbols, which ensure an experience of the lifeworld as a whole (Voegelin), that connect subworlds such as religion, science, dreams, etc., are rather to be characterized by a relevance “annihilation” between appresentational orders. (shrink)

The article focuses on the ontological foundations of lifeworld as Being taken for granted and viewed as a communication phenomenon par excellence, conceptualized as signifying in the presence of others. It is argued that, because there is always a wider horizon of experience against which anything can appear, lifeworld as something continuous can only be thematized in discrete scientific forms. In the article, lifeworld is discussed through the perspectives of four different sciences. From the natural science perspective, lifeworld is conceptualized (...) as an arrangement contingent on the interconnections of human and nonhuman beings. It takes the form of conversation and can be best examined by Conversation Analysis. From the social science perspective, lifeworld is conceptualized as an order that is constituted by symbolic interactions and guided by relevant types and rules that structure our experience. It takes the form of intersubjective action as a meaningful back and forth and can be best examined by Discourse Analysis. From the cultural sciences perspective, lifeworld is the realm of spirit passed from generation to generation that gives human culture its meaning. It takes the form of significant expressions and can be best examined by Textual Hermeneutic Analysis. And, from the philosophical perspective, lifeworld is constituted by phenomena that appear, or monstrate themselves, to consciousness. This lifeworld is of absolute reversibility and immediacy and can be best examined by Critical Analysis, i.e., by postulating our relation to any object through contemplation. Thus, as Being, lifeworld is said in many ways, each lifeworld being relevant in its own way by providing a valuable resource – physico-biological, normative, significational, and transcendental. (shrink)

Following the levels of intentionality and semiosis distinguished by the Semiotic Hierarchy, and the distinction between original agency and enhanced agency, we propose a model of an agency hierarchy, consisting of six layers. Consistent with the phenomenological orientation of cognitive semiotics, a central claim is that agency and subjectivity are complementary aspects of intentionality. Hence, there is no agency without at least the minimal sense/feeling of agency. This perspective rules out all artefacts as genuine agents, as well as simple organisms, (...) since it is highly unlikely that e.g. bacteria have any first-person perspective. Using this model, we review and assess recent proposals on the nature of agency from cognitive science, and neuroscience, and draw conclusions on how to incorporate aspects of them within a synthetic cognitive-semiotic framework. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.